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May 19, 1983 COnferenc
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 94 Original

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

SOUTH CAROLINA

\______

v.
REGAN,

complaintl
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing section 310(b)(l) of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest
on a state's unregistered general obligations issued after JUne 30, 1983 to be
taxable income.

The bill of complaint seeks a declaration that Section

310(b)(l) is unconstitutional in that it imposes conditions upon south
Carolina's power to borrow money and impairs South Carolina's ability to
function as a sovereign under the Tenth Amendment.

This application,

originally filed with the Chief Justice, is referred to the Conference.
l'Ihe motion for leave to file a bill of corrplaint appears on List 1,
Sheet 4 for the June 2, 1983 COnfererce.
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FACTS:

section 310 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsbility Act of

1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 stat. 596 (the 1982 Tax
effort by congress to encourage the use of r
bonds

(usually with coupons attached).

Act)~.

represents an

istered bonds rather

thad~

Section 310(b)(l) adds a new

~

subsection (j) to Section 103 of the 1954 Code stating that section 103(a)
shall not provide an exemption from federal income tax for interest paid by a
state to its lenders on any registration-required obligation that is not
issued in registration form.
south Carolina filed its motion for leave to file a bill of complaint on
February 9, 1983 and its motion for preliminary injunction on May 10, 1983.
The SG filed a brief in opposition on May 12, 1983.
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS:

SOuth Carolina maintains

that this case presents a justiciable controversy over which the court has,
and should assume, original jurisdiction.

It contends that it is the real

party in interest because the tax exempt status, of its bonds are at issue, and
because it will be damaged monetarily by enforcement of §310(b)(l).

The case

has substantial importance, according to south carolina, since §310(b)(l) will
burden South Carolina by an extra $2.8 million on a single moderate-sized sale
of capital improvement general obligations; will affect general obligation
bonds issued by other states in excess of $19 million (based on 1982 figures);
and will affect municipal paper throughout the United states in excess of $70
billion.

secondly, south carolina argues that original jurisdiction is

appropriate--even

~ough

not exclusive--because Congress has effectively

foreclosed consideration of such cases by a lower court:

(a) the

Anti-Injunction Act, 26 u.s.c. §742l(a), states that no action may be
maintained which seeks to enjoin the levy or collection of federal taxes; and
(b) the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, expressly forbids

declaratory judgments concerning tax matters.

see Alexander v. Americans

United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n. 10 (1974); and cf., Bob Jones UniversitY v.
Simon, 416 u.s. 725 (1974).
(2)

south Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) impairs its constitutional

right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation, as well as
its express· right under the Tenth Anendment to borrow money.

That section, it

argues, has effectively restricted the alternatives available to south
carolina to issue

obligat~ons

in the manner it deems most suitable to effect

its responsibilities and to perform its essential functions, contrary to
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976) and Hodel v. Virginia
Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 u.s. 264 (1981).
(3)

SOuth Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) is unconstitutional because

it subjects the interest paid on the debt obligations . issued ·by the state in
bearer form to federal income taxation.

south Carolina argues that the

sixteenth Amendment was not intended to grant Congress the J=Ower to tax the
income from state obligations.
SG'S CONTENTIONS:
statute:

(1)

The SG contends that this suit is prohibited by

the Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purp::lse of

restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person;" and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c.

(Supp~

V)

2201 precludes issuance of declaratory judgments "with respect to federal
taxes."

Taxpayers seeking to challenge this provision may do so in the u.

s.

Tax court, u.s. Claims Court, or in a DC; but south Carolina is not a taxpayer.
(2)

The only exception to the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act is where

the taxpayer can demonstrate that equity jurisdiction would otherwise be
available and where the government clearly cannot prevail on the merits of its
claim.

Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 u.s. 725, 737 (1974).

This case

does not fall within that category since the registration requirement is a

necessary and proper exercise of congressional power granted under Article I.
Additionally, the registration r~uirement seeks to deter~. violations of 18 '
u.s.c. 2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of
stolen or forged securities, and will facilitate apprehension of violators.
(3}

There is no merit, argues the SG,

to South Carolina's claim that

§310(b}(l} imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary
function of state government.

The requirement that securities be issued in

registered form if the interest therefrom is to be tax exempt in the hands of
the lender does not restrict the state's borrowing power.

It is not

discriminatory against state obligations since registration is required of
similar obligations of the United states, and unregistered corporate
obligations deny the issuer an income tax deduction for interest paid.

And

south carolina's claim of monetary damage ignores the offsetting benefits of
handling and insurance resulting from reduced risks of loss or theft, all of
which add to the attractiveness of registered bonds.

Clearly §310(b)(l) does

not in fact limit, modify, or qualify a state's borrowing power.
(4)

Original jurisdiction should not be exercised in a case such as this

case where jurisdiction in this Court is not exclusive.

A district court

plainly could hear the case more promptly; and the jurisdictional and
constitutional questions presented in this case are not of sufficient urgency
to the country to demand this Court's attention.
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:
argues that a preliminary injunction is warranted because:

South Carolina

(1) the July 1,

1983 effective date of the Act is likely to arrive without a decision by this
Court regarding the bill of complaint; (2) the issues presented in this case
are of substantial importance because some 24 states have now joined in south
Carolina's request for the Court to assume original jurisdiction; (3} a
preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo beyond their

July 1, 1983 effective date of the Act; (4) irreparable injury will result to
California in the form of

incre~sed

economic burden and impaired state

sovereignty.
DISCUSSION:

only the motion for preliminary injunction is before the

Court at this time, not the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.
----------------~~--·------------ASide from the issues of original jurisdiction an~ the likelihood of
s uccess on the merits, South Carolina has failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm.

Even assuming the validity of its arguments addressing those issues, no

substantial harm (other than administrative preparation) will begall South
Carolina before July 1, 1983--the effective date of the Act.

Thus south

carolina seeks relief essentially to restrain enforcement of the Act after
that date in the belief that the Court may be unable to reach a decision prior
to that time.

As noted earlier, the bill of complaint is set for the June 2,

1983 conference.

Hence injunctive relief pending decision at least on the

motion for leave to file the bill of cornplaint .at this point seems
unnecessary.

I recommend that the request for injunctive relief be denied.

Alternatively, it might be relisted for consideration at the June 1, 1983
along with the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint.
There is an opposition to the motion for leave to file the bill of
complaint only.
5/18/83
PJC

Caldwell
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May 19, 1983 COnference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 94 Original

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

SOUTH CAROLINA

v.
REGAN, secretary of Treasury
SUMMARY:

Pending decision on its motion for leave to file a bill of

complaintl under the Court's original jurisdiction, South carolina seeks to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing Section 310(b)(l) of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest
on a state's unregistered general obligations ·issued after JUne 30, 1983 to be
taxable income.
310(b)(l) is

The bill of complaint seeks a declaration that Section

unconst~tutional

in that it iffiP?ses conditions upon South

Carolina's power to borrow money and impairs South carolina's ability to
function as a sovereign under the Tenth Amendment.

This application,

originally filed with the Chief Justice, is referred to the Conference.
lThe motion for leave to file a bill of complaint appears on List 1,
Sheet 4 for the June 2, 1983 Conference .
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1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596 (the 1982 Tax

Act)~

represents an

effort by COngress to encourage the use of registered bonds rather than bearer
bonds

(usually with coupons attached).

Section 310(b)(l) adds a new

subsection (j) to Section 103 of the 1954 Oode stating that section 103(a)
shall not provide an exemption from federal income tax for interest paid by a
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obligation that is not

issued in registration form.
south Carolina filed its motion for leave to file a bill of complaint on
February 9, 1983 and its motion for preliminary injunction on May 10, 1983.
The SG filed a brief in opposition on May 12, 1983.
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS ON THE MERITS:

SOuth Carolina maintains

that this case presents a justiciable controversy over .which the court has,
and should assume, original jurisdiction.

It contends that it is the real

party in interest because the tax exempt status..~f its bonds are at issue, and
because it will be damaged monetarily by enforcement of §310(b}(l).

The case

has substantial importance, according to south Carolina, since §310(b}(l} will
burden South Carolina by an extra $2.8 million on a single moderate-sized sale

.

of capital improvement general obligations; will affect general obligation
.............
bonds issued by other states in excess of $19 million (based on 1982 .figUres);

.

---

and will affect municipal paper throughout the United states in excess of $70
billion.

secondly, south carolina argues that original jurisdiction is

appropriate--even though not exclusive--because Congress has effectively
foreclosed consideration of such cases by a lower court:

(a} the

Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §742l(a), states that no action may be
maintained which seeks to enjoin the levy or collection of federal taxes; and
(b) the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, expressly forbids

•

< •

United, Inc., 416 u.s. 752, 759 n. 10 (1974); and cf.,

Bop Jones University v.

Simon, 416 u.s. 725 (1974).
' .

(2)

South carolina contends that §310(b)(l) impairs its constitutional

right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation, as well as
its express right under the Tenth Anendment to borrow

~~ney.

That section, it

argues, has effectively restricted the alternatives available to south
C<i!olina to

i ~s_in
~

~

the manner it deems most suitable to effect
'--,.....-.,

its responsibilities and to perform its essential functions, contrary to
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976) and Hodel v. Virginia
Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
(3)

South Carolina contends that §310(b)(l) is unconstitutional because

it subjects the interest paid on the debt obligationsissued by the state in
bearer form to federal income taxation.

South Carolina argues that the

Sixteenth Amendment was not intended to grant C?ngress the power to tax the
income from state obligations.
SG 1 S CONTENTIONS:
statute:

(1)

The SG contends that this suit is prohibited by

the Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the p.1rpose of

restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person; • and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 u.s.c. (Supp. V)
2201 precludes issuance of declaratory judgments "with respect to federal
taxes.•

Taxpayers seeking to challenge this provision may do so in the U. s.

Tax court, u.s. Claims court, or in a DC; but south Carolina is not a taxpayer.
(2)

'rtle only exception to the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act is where

the taxpayer can demonstrate that equity jurisdiction would otherwise be
available and where the government clearly cannot prevail on the merits of its
claim.

Bob Jones University v. simon, 416 u.s. 725, 737 (1974).

This case

does not fall within that category since the registration requirement is a

necessa~y

dJ~

p~upec

exe~c~se

Additionally, the registration

u.s.c.

or

cong~ess~ona~

r~uirement

power

grant~a

unaer Art1Cle I.

seeks to deter-violations of 18

2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of
'·

stolen or forged securities, and will facilitate apprehension of violators.
(3)

There is no merit, argues the SG,

to South Carolina's claim that

§310(b)(l) imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary
\

function of state government.

The requirement that securities be issued in

registered form if the interest therefrom is to be tax exerrpt in the hands of
the lender does not restrict the state's borrowing power.

-----------------~~-------~~--~------------

It is not

-

discriminatory against state obligations since registration is required of

-

similar obligations of the United states, and unregistered corporate

------~---~~----~--------------obligations
deny the issuer an income tax deduction for interest paid. . And

-

south carolina's claim of monetary damage ignores the offsetting benefits of
handling and insurance resulting from reduced risks of loss or theft, all of
which add to the attractiveness of registered bopds.

Clearly §310(b)(l) does

not in fact limit, modify, or qualify a state's borrowing power.
(4)

Original jurisdiction should not be exercised in a case such as this

case where jurisdiction in this Court is not exclusive.

A district court

plainly could hear the case more promptly; and the jurisdictional and
constitutional questions presented in this case are not of sufficient urgency
to the country to demand this Court's attention.
SOUTH CAROLINA'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:
argues that a

preli~nary

injunction is warranted because:

South Carolina

(1) the July 1,

1983 effective date of the Act is likely to arrive without a decision by this
Court regarding the bill of complaint; (2) the issues presented in this case
are of substantial importance because some 24 states have now joined in South
carolina's request for the Court to assume original jurisdiction; (3) a
preliminary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo beyond their

_,

---~

----

-

-

california in the form of

--

-

-

-- - -

---

incre~sed

-

p
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-

- - - ------
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economic burden and impaired state

sovereignty.
DISCUSSION:

Only the motion for preliminary injunction is before the

court at this time, not the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint.
Aside from the issues of original jurisdiction anq the likelihood of
·,

success on the merits, south carolina has failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm.

Even assuming the validity of its arguments addressing those issues, no

substantial harm (other than administrative preparation) will begall south
Carolina before July 1, 1983--the effective date of the Act.

Thus south

Carolina seeks relief essentially to restrain enforcement of the Act after
that date in the belief that the Court may be unable to reach a decision prior
to that time.

As noted earlier, the bill of complaint is set for the June 2,

1983 Conference.

Hence injunctive relief pending decision at least on the

motion for leave to file the bill of complaint.at this point seems
unnecessary.

I

recommend that the request for injunctive relief be denied.

Alternatively, it might be relisted for consideration at the June 1, 1983
along with the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint.
There is an opposition to the motion for leave to file the bill of
complaint only.
5/18/83
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June 2, 1983 COnference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 94 Original

1

~~~~ Complaint

SOUTH CARU,INA

J'

v.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

r

REGAN, sec. of Treasury
SUMMARY:

South Carolina seeks to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury

from enforcing section 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
'~

'l

Act of 1982 insofar as it deems interest on a state's unregistered general
obligations issued after June 30, 1983 to be taxable income.

South carolina

also seeks leave to file a bill of complaint under the Court's original
jurisdiction for a declaration that section 310(b)(l) is unconstitutional in
that it imposes conditions upon south carolina's power to borrow money and
impairs South Carolina's ability to function as a sovereign under the Tenth
Amendment.
BACKGROUND:

'Ihe facts and contentions pertaining to both the bill of

complaint and the injunction are set forth in a Legal Office memorandum
~

prepared and circulated for the May 19, 1983 Conference.

bl

A copy is attached.

~ ~ri\~ ~ ~
~.-\c. f~ ~· ~k .\AAUll ~ ~ ~
~ . 6s.c. ~ ~ u~ ~- ~\... <'owJ.
~ ~ ~4o ~ ~

UllJ)_

~ & ~~0~~-At!

..

~,;.

'
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:

In my view, this case is appropriate for exercise

of the Court's original, nonexclusive jurisdiction:

the ease presents a

justiciable controversy; the state of south carolina appears to be the real

.

.....¥~. . . . . . . .........,

party in interest as its bonds

Act~the

affected by the
~

sq

question

'

presented is substantially a legal one, not requiring extensive factual
development in district court.

The SG contends that the, issue is not

sufficiently important to warrant the attention of this court.

,,

would appear that the contrary is true since any

~

.

However, it

wc:_uld equally
-,
deci~n

affect the 24 states who have joined south Carolina's request.

This case is

~
~-~
~~~--------------~
~~ unlike
United
states v. Nevada, 412 u.s. 534 (1973) where this Court

/);"/

declined

to exercise its original jurisdiction on a claim seeking to settle water
rights within a single state; rather, the issue presented affects the rights
of half the states in the Nation.
-----------~~

As regards the subject matter, it more

t

closely resembles United states v. North Carolina, 136

u.s.

211 (1889), which

involved a claim by the United states to recover.against a state on its bonds
and leave to file a bill of complaint was granted.
INJUNCTION:

The SG contends that this suit for injunctive and

declaratory relief is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
United", 416

This court addressed a similar issue in Alexander v. "Americans

u.s.

752, 758-59 (1974) where it said:

To reiterate, the Court in Williams Packing [370 u.s. 1
(1962)] unanimously held that a pre-enforcement injunction
against the assessment or collection of taxes may be
granted only (i) "if it is clear that under no circumstances
could the Government ultimately prevail • . • ,"and (ii) "if
equity jurisdiction otherwise exists." Ibid. Unless both
conditions are met, a suit for preventive-Injunctive relief
must be dismissed.

'"

If the existence of equity jurisdiction in this Court may be assumed, then it
would appear that the injunction requested should be denied unless it is clear
that the government could not ultimately prevail under. any circumstances.
my view, such is not the case.

In

The SG has presented conpelli03 justification

for section §310(b)(l): that it is a necessary and proper exercise of
congressional power under Article I; that it seeks to deter violations of 18
u.s.c. 2314 and 2315 which concern the transportation and disposition of
stolen or forged securities; that a state's borrowi03 power is not restricted
simply by the requirement that securities be issued in a registered form; that
the requirement is not

di ~ natory,

etc.

Hence, because the government

could ultimately prevail, Williams Packing would seem to direct that
injunctive relief be denied.
BILL OF COMPLAINT:

The remaini03 issue appears to be whether section

310(b)(l) imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a necessary
function of state government.

The

SG

contends that this issue lacks

sufficient import to warrant exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction.
south carolina contends that section 310(b)(l) will impair its constitutional
right as a sovereign to borrow money free from federal regulation as well as
its express right under the Tenth Amendment to borrow money.

It maintains

that the section has effectively restricted its alternatives to issue
obligations in the manner it deems suitable.

Although I remain unpersuaded as

to the merits of south Carolina's claim, I consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to warrant exercise of the court's original jurisdiction,
particularly in light of the number of states affected.
CONCLUSION:

I reconmend that the motion for injunctive relief be denied,

that the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint be granted, that a
special master be appointed, and that the case be referred to the master.
6/l/83
PJC
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94 Orig. South Carolina

v. Regan

TO THE CONFERENCE:
The above case, set for argument on October 5, involves - as the substantive constitutional question - the
validity of a provision of the fe~eral 1982 Tax 'ct that had
the effect, after June 30, 1983, of requiring that municipal
bonds be issued in registered form if the interest thereon
·· i.s to be exempt from federal i..ncome taxation.
,~

~·

The briefs, filed on behalf of South Carolina and
th'e amicus brief on behalf of. 24 other states, i.nclud inq
· ~~fidavtts, argue that the e~fect of this requirement i~ to
bu.:r;den the sovereign authority of Rtates to borrow money.
The affidavits assert that most municipal bonds had been
; issued in bearer form, and that the re~uirement of reglstra.• tion will add substantial additional costs to the borrowing
Qf money. One of the elements of additional cost is an increase in interest payahle by 1/4-1/2 percent. In a~dition
· the fees of the paying and transfer agents (usually hanks)
are higher for the handling of registered than for bearer
bonds .
.I

I am prompt~d to circulate this memorandum because
my family accounts, rnanaqed by United Virginia Bank, contain
rnunJcipal bonds. 1 am informed by the bank that most of the
municipal bonds it holds in most if not all of its accounts
are in bearer form excPpt those purchased since June 30. At
least arguably, I suppose - if the affidavits are correct . the purchasers of municipal bonds issued after June 30 may
benefit from some increase in interest rates .
This presents a question of disqualification for
me . It occurs to me that possibly other ,Just ices have the
same auestion . The Reporter ' s Notes to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct state that "government securities" do not
require disqualification unless "the value of [the] int~rest
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

: "'·

.

. '

,...,'· ..
'

'

2.

proceedings • • • " p. 71. I doubt that one's interest would
be "substantially affected" in view of the various factors
that influence the price of these bonds at the time of issue
and again at the time a person happens to acquire them. The
question, however, is one that perhaps we can discuss at
Conference.

L.F.Jr.,
ss

..

---·------·--------

~'

.

..

.

violates the lOth Amendment by requiring the states to issue
general obligation municipal bonds in fully registered form
before the interest thereon will be tax exempt.
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I. BACKGROUND: The TEFRA Amendment

Prior to the TEFRA Amendment, §103(a) of the IRC
provided that the interest payable on all general obligation
bonds issued by the states, or their political subdivisons, would
be exempt from federal income tax.

Section 310(b) (1) of TEFRA

amended §103(a) to eliminate the exemption from federal income
tax for interest on any "registration-required" obligation that
--------------~

is not issued in registered form.

The registration requirement

applied to virtually all general obligation municipal bonds.
South Carolina argues that this amendment effectively prohibits
it from offering municipal bonds in bearer form and that because
it intrudes on the state's sovereign power to borrow money,
§310(b) (1) violates the lOth Amendment.

~

~~

Section 310(b) (1) is but one of the statutory provisions

rough which Congress has attempted- to eliminate the use of
bearer bonds.

The other provisions in §310 require that

~~rtually every obligation of

~ form

the United States be in registered

and dictate adverse tax consequences for private issuers and

purchasers of bearer bonds.

See SG's Brief at 3-4

The expressed

purpose of the statutory effort to curtail the use of bearer
bonds was to obtain a fairer and more efficient system of
information reporting and

an~

withholdin~

reduce tax avoidance,

reduce the volume of "readily negotiable

ca ~le

substitu~

to persons engaged in illegal activities."

Rep. No. 97-494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1982)

for
1

s.

South Carolina

claims that these goals do not justify the federal intrusion on

~

her sovereign power to borrow money in the manner she believes
best.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Because this case involves a

sui ~ \ between

(S-4:.trft~;>

a state and a

citizen of another state, this Court has original but not
1\
exclusive jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. Art. III, Clause 2 The
decision whether to exercise this jurisdiction generally is
discretionary.

However, the

~liciter General argues that in

this case the Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction by two
statutes -

the ~nti-Injunction

Act and

th~federal

tax exception

to the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Anti-Injunction Act, 26

u.s.c.

§742l(a), provides in

relevant part that
"[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining
assessment or collection of any tax shall be
c---..__·

in any court by any person, whether
is the person against whom such tax
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

u.s.c.

§2201, provides

In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any ~~
court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading may declare the rights or other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such

~~~

fv

~

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
added)
two statutes are applicable
bar suit in the lower courts.

_

However, it argues that the

bar suit in this Court because Congress
may not
........__
_____,
itutionally granted original
- ---· ution of the constitutional issue is
-

suit is not statutorily barred.

As you wrote

in ~ob

Jones University v. Simon, 416

u.s.

725, 736 (1974), the Anti-Injunction Act "has no legislative
history, but its language could scarcely be more explicit."
Nevertheless, the courts have maintained "a cyclical pattern of
allegiance to the

~ain

meaning of the Act." 416

u.s.

at 742

This ended with this Court's decision in Enoch v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), which held that the
Act applies absent a showing that the Service's position is
plainly without a legal basis.

~ob

Jones re-enforced the Court's

commitment to the plain language of the Act.

Thus, any

irreparable harm that enforcement of §310(b) (1) would occasion
does not create an exception to the Act, and petitioner does not
so argue.
Neither does petitioner argue that because its suit does
not seek to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes it is
not barred by the Act.

This arguement also is foreclosed by the

.' .
;

decision in Bob Jones.

In that case, an injunction would have

prevented the assessment and collection of taxes both from the
petitioner and from the petitioner's donors.

In this case, South

Carolina is not a taxpayer, and an injunction would prevent
assessment and collection only from those who purchase the

-

state's general obligation bonds.

~ i~nt.

This distinction is

You wrote in Bob Jones:

"~etitioner

seeks to lower the taxes of those other than itself, the Act is
nonetheless controlling." 416

u.s.

at 725

Thus, as to the Anti-

Injunction Act, the Court may not avoid the constitutional

WJL~

~'

question that South Carolina presents.

~.
Although it has ne~ressly so held, the Court has

--------........

__

----

suggested that Congress
may no!:.._liffii.t_
this...._Court's
original
__.......,___.
"---......
..........
jurisdiction.

In California v. Arizona, 440

u.s.

59, 66 (1979),

the Court in dicta stated that "Congress has broad powers over
the jurisdiction of the federal courts ••• but it is extremely
doubtful that they include the power to limit

the original

jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution."

Alternately, the Court could reach the due process challenge to
the Act that was left open in Bob Jones.

In that case, the

'-7

taxpayer had several means of acquiring judicial review.
it was liable

fo~

Because

various taxes under the challenged revenue

ruling, it could petition the Tax Court to review a notice of
deficiency after assessment.

Or, it could pay the taxes and then

bring a refund suit in federal district court or in the Court of
Claims.

Finally, petitioner in Bob Jones could secure a

"friendly donor" who would be willing to make a contribution and
then litigate its deductability.

Because South Carolina is not a

taxpayer, only the third course is available here.

You noted in

a footnote in Bob Jones that the "friendly donor" alternative may
not satisfy due process requirements.

416

u.s.

at 747 n.21

Forcing South Carolina to rely on a "friendly bond

'""'"

~

purchaser" seems especially inadequate.

Although a sense of

to the community plays a part in the purchase of municipal bonds,

~

these debt instruments are purchased in large part for profit.
South Carolina argues convincingly that without tax-exempt
interest, or significantly higher interest rates, bearer bonds
will not sell.

I question whether consistent with due process

this Court may condition South Carolina's access to judicial
review on its ability to persuade a potential bond purchaser to
make an unattractive investment and then to endure rigorous
litigation with the IRS.

If the Court does create a due process

exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, it should be a narrow one,
limited to situations where the interested party is not a
taxpayer and will have no other opportunity to seek judicial
review.

Otherwise, the exception will encourage much future

litigation by other plaintiffs claiming that various applications

·.

of the Act violate due process.

Because a due process exception

to the Act would make other forums available to petitioner, this
Court would not need to exercise its original jurisdiction.

2. Declaratory Judgment Act

In 1934, Congress created a new remedy that allowed
parties to obtain a declaration of their rights and legal
obligations, whether or not additional relief was requested.
Reaffirming the restrictions contained in the Anti-Injunction
Act, Congress immediately excepted from this new remedy any
controversy over ; Eederal tax liabilit~\ In Bob Jones, you noted
that "[t]here is no dispute ••• that the federal tax exception to
theVOeclaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the AntiInjunction Act." 416

u.s.

------------~

at 733 n.7

There is no constitutional problem with this statutory
limitation.

Unlike traditional equity relief, declaratory

relief is a statutory creation.

Congress decided that such

relief was appropriate only in certain cases.

Cases concerning

federal tax liability w~re not among them. Congress
constitutionally may create a special remedy applicable to all
cases or only to some cases but in all courts.

"Either action

would bind this Court even in the exercise of its original
jurisdicticin."

---- -

However, no constitutional problem would arise
~-----~----~

~

unless Congress simultaneously conferred original jurisdiction
over declaratory actions in federal courts and withdrew the

original jurisdiction of this Court. Cf. California v. Arizona,
440

u.s.

at 65 (discussing waiver of sovereign immunity).
One might argue that 26

u.s.c.

§7478, which was passed

after Bob Jones, indicates a legislative intent to exclude from
'--

-

7

the federal tax exception of the Declaratory Judgment Act all
requests for declaratory relief under §103(a) made by issuers of
government securities. 1

Section 7478 provides

In a case of actual controversy involving (1) a determination by the Secretary whether
prospective obligations are described in section 103(a)
.•• upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the Tax
Court may make a declaration whether such prospective
obligations are described in section 103(a).
The purpose behind the provision is to permit government issuers
to obtain a determination whether the interest payable on their
government securities will .be tax exempt.

Implicit in this

~

~.

provision is a recognition that suits for refund do not
adequately protect an

is~uer's

interest under §103(a).

If there

is some question whether the exemption applies, the government

-------"""""-not fare well

....
securitie~ll

~-----

in the market.

The only way to

ensure against this soft market is to obtain advance assurance of
a §103(a) exemption.

If no exemption is available, the

government may well consider alternate ways of raising money.
This is ~actly South Carolina's position.

~

The state

1 Neither South Carolina nor the amici make this argument.
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has legitimate doubts concerning the constitutionality of
§310(b) (1).

~

Before it makes the costly switch to registered

bonds, or makes the equally costly decision to issue bearer bonds
at a higher interest rate, it wishes to have those doubts
resolved.

This case seems to fit squarely within the legislative

purpose of §7478.
l~gua~.

~

However, it does not fit within its statutory

The declaratory judgment authorized by this section

must be brought intially in the Tax Court and only after the
issuer has exhausted administrative remedies.

The procedural

requirements and the statutory language seem to "limit the scope
of the proceeding to issues of statutory coverage or
construction." (SG's Brief at 5 n.6)

It seems inappropriate to

direct to the Tax Court, and to administrative proceedings, the
question whether or not a provision of the IRC is constitutional.
Thus,

pe~itioner

may maintain its claim for declaratory

relief only if this Court is willing to rely on the legislative
intent behind §7478 ' to imply an exception from the otherwise
unqualified federal tax liability exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act.

There are several advantages to this statutory

construction.

First, the Court may avoid the constitutional

issues presented by the Anti-Injunction Act.

If South Carolina
~

may

~eek

declaratory relief, there is no practical need for an

injunction.
~

merits.

~

~-

~

.

~--------

Second, this Court would not have to address the

Because other forums will be available to entertain

petitioner's claim for declaratory relief, this Court need not
exercise its original jurisdiction.

Third, the interpretation

creates a very small exception to the federal tax exception of

7'~

the Declaratory Judgment Act, and one that Congress arguably
intended.

3. Summary

I recommend that the Court exercise its original
jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act on the ground that

-------.......__._______________

-

Congress may not restrict the constitutional
............__----- grant of such
jurisdiction •

-

~

This creates the narrowest possible exception to

.....____...,

the Anti-Injunction Act.

The

-

d~

process exception to the Act is

equally respectable and may be sufficiently narrowed so as not to
undermine the Act.

I hesitate recommending that course only ~

because it has not been briefed.

Although the due process

~

exception would not require the Court to exercise its original
jurisdicition, sending the case back to federal district
may create a delay that will be extremely costly to the

~ .

~

court~.

state ~

bond market.

If the delay is tolerable it may be wise to choose

that course.

The above suggested statutory interpretation of the

§7478 is strained and also is not briefed.

B. Merits

South Carolina raises two constitutional challenges to
§310(b) (1).

First, it argues that the tax-exempt status of

interest payable on municipal bonds is not conferred by statute

--

but by the Constitution.

Thus, Congress may not authorize a

federal income tax on the interest paid on municipal bearer

#

.. '

I•""'

bonds.

Second, petitioner argues that borrowing money is a

fundamental aspect of state sovereignty.

Any attempt by Congress

to prescribe how the states must exercise that sovereign power
violates the lOth Amendment.

1.

Consti ~~Ta~u;~~~ ~

---? --.

~~- ~lev~~

I

South Carolina argues that the constitutional immunity

~~

of both federal and state governments from taxation by the other
prohibits a federal income tax on the interest on municipal
bonds, and thus that §310(b) (1) is unconstitutional.

I

disagree. ~

Petitioner relies exclusively on this Court's decision in Pollack
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157

u.s.

429 (1894), and on the

historical tax exemption accorded municipal bond interest.
Pollack was a pre-16th Amendment case.

To the extent that it

held that a tax on income from property interests was a direct
tax that could not be individually levied on the citizens of the
state, it has been overruled by the 16th Amendment. 2

To the

extent that it held that a tax on the interest on municipal bonds
constituted an unconstitutional tax on the issuing government,
its reasoning has been repudiated.

~

~

Since enactment of the 16th ?

---

Amendment, the historical exemption for municipal bond inte! est)
has been purely statutory.
2Before the 16th Amendment, all direct federal taxes imposed on
the citizens of a state had to be apportioned according to the
state's representation in Congress.

~

J-Lv~

Applying the doctrine of government immunity from
taxation, Pollack reasoned that any tax that worked an economic
burden on state government was an unconstitutional tax on the
state. 3 157

u.s.

reasoning.

In Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306

at 586

This Court expressly has rejected that

u.s.

466,

480 (1939), the Court held that
The theory, which once won a qualified approval, that a
tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its
source, is no longer tenable.
Since Graves, this Court consistently has held that nondiscriminatory taxes, the legal incidence of which do not fall on
federal or state government, do not violate the constitutional
immunity of government from taxation.

See, e.g., Memphis Bank &

Trust Co. v. Garner, 51 U.S.L.W. 4104 (Jan. 24, 1983); United
States v. Fresno, 429

u.s.

452 (1977).

The TEFRA amendment to §103(a) does not impose a

-r/..
./\/, .A->
~~~

discriminatory tax on the interest payable on municipal bonds.

~

All government bonds - federal and state - must be in

--

registered form.

The Court observed in Graves that a non-

discriminatory tax imposed on those who deal with state or
federal government may violate the constitutional immunity of
that government only where "the economic burden on the •••
government is tantamount to

an . ~nterference

by one government

3 Pollack expressly relied for this proposition on the Court's
decision in Collector v. ~, 78 u.s. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), and
Dobbins v. Commissioners, 41 u.s. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), both of
which have been overruled.

with the other in performance of its functions." 306

u.s.

at 481

The constitutionality of a state tax that burdens the federal
government raises an issue under the Supremacy Clause.

The

constitutionality of a federal tax that burdens a state
government raises an issue under the lOth Amendment.

2. Tenth Amendment

The challenged regulation is an exercise of Congress's
taxing powers rather than its powers under the Commerce Clause.
-,
This does not seem to change the lOth Amendment analysis. The
~

Court stated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
842 (1976), that "there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignity, even when exercising its otherwise
plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce."

Thus, §310(b) (1)

violates the lOth Amendment if it significantly interferes with
South Carolina's ability to exercise a sovereign power.

The

sovereign power implicated in this case is the power to borrow
money.

This is a fundamental sovereign power reserved to the

states by the lOth Amendment. See Pollack, 157

u.s.

at 585

The

degree of federal interference that this sovereign power will
tolerate under the lOth Amendment must be measured under the
analysis proposed by Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel.
Ass ' n, 4 52 u. S . 2 6 4 ( 19 81) •

~Hodel articulated a three-part test to identify lOth
Amendment violations.

Federal action violates the lOth Amendment

only if it satisfies all three parts of that test.

First, the

federal action must regulate the states as states.

Second, the

federal action must "address matters that are indisputably
attributes of state sovereignty."

Finally, it must be apparent

that the federal action "would directly impair [the state's]
ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
government functions." 4 452 u.s. at 287-88
The first two requirements of the Hodel test are
satisfied in this case.

Although the federal tax falls on

individual bondholders, the motivating purpose of §310(b) (1) was
to "encourage" states to issue registered bonds.

The federal law

does not require the states to issue registered bonds.

However,

the alternative is, according to petitioner, economically
unfeasible.

Providing such a choice arguably is federal

regulation in substance if not in form.

To the extent that the

expressed intent of the federal law is to deter states from
issuing municipal bearer bonds, it regulates the
states.

st~tes

as

As to the second requirement, §310(b) (1) clearly

"addresses" the state's power to borrow money, and this power is
"indisputably [an] attribute[] of state sovereignty."

It is the

requirement that is the most troublesome.
Section 310(b) (1) is offensive because it intrudes on
sovereign power to borrow money.

South Carolina

that the intrusion impairs its ability to perform its
4
Even if all three of these requirements are met, there may be
no lOth Amendment violation if the federal interest protected by
the contested federal action justifies the intrusion into state
sovereignty. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29

..

~~

•·

,; ..

'

~~

I

.

"'

•

•·
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traditional government functions by raising the costs of
borrowing, decreasing the state's revenue, and leaving fewer
resources available for other vital state services.

Under the

third prong of the Hodel test, the measure of tolerable federal
intrusion is a matter of degree, necessitating an inquiry into
the practical effect of the challenged provision.
According to South Carolina's brief, and the briefs and
affidavits submitted by the amici, issuing municipal bonds in
fully registered form would increase the interest rate by 1/4% to
1/2% over that payable on bearer bonds.

This projected increase
~---

is attributable to two factors: (1} underwriters believe that
reg1stered bonds are more difficult to sell: and, (2}
registration increases the fees that paying agents charge
issuers.

As illustrative of the effect of this interest increase

on the cost of state borrowing, South Carolina refers to a 1982
bond issue of $115 million.

The bonds were issued in bearer form

with a maturity period of 15 years and interest of 8.667%.

The

total interest cost to South Carolina over the life of the bonds
will be $97,247,668.

If the bonds had been issued in registered

form, the interest would have increased 1/4% to 8.92%.

This

would have saddled South Carolina with an additional $2.8 million
in interest costs over the 15 year life of the bonds.

The state

argues that if, as projected, the registration requirement adds
an additional $2.8 million to its interest cost on a single
"moderately" sized bond issue, the cumulative burden of these
added costs will impair seriously its ability to borrow money and
to perform its traditional government functions.

The SG's brief takes issue with this . analysis.

The SG

argues that South Carolina's projected increase in costs ignores
the "offsetting economies of handling and insurance, resulting
from reduced risk of loss or theft." (SG's Brief at 9)

I know

too little about the bond business to evaluate either argument.
I will look into it more if you like.
Assuming that South Carolina's cost projection is
accurate, the Court must determine whether the degree of federal
------------------~

intrusion is tolerable under the third prong of the Hodel test.
~

In EEOC v. Wyoming, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (March 2, 1983), the Court
held that a federal regulation runs afoul of the lOth Amendment
only if it threatens the state's "separate and independent"

existence.

In resolving that issue, the first question is

whether the contested exercise of Congress's taxing power is
sufficiently coercive to amount to an intrusion at all.
tax is in some measure regulatory.

"Every

To some extent it interposes

an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with
others not taxed •••• [T]he location of the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be an inducement
[is] a question of degree." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301

u.s.

548, 589-90 (1937)

(Cardoza, J.).

The coercive effect of

§310(b) (1) depends on the ecomomic feasibility of offering bearer
bonds that do not provide tax-exempt interest and the costliness
of offering registered bonds.
both those issues.

There is a factual dispute over

Assuming a fair degree of coercion, the

existence of a choice nevertheless ameliorates the intrusion
somewhat.

There was no such choice in National League of Cities.

.;;.
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The intrusion in this case seems closer to the one

~lerated in Wyoming than the one found offensive in National
League of Cities.s

The Court in Wyoming found that the contested

federal regulation required the state to achieve its goals
consistently with federal standards but that it did not "require
the state to abandon those goals."
this case.

Arguably, the same is true in

South Carolina may continue to borrow money by

issuing municipal bonds that pay tax-exempt interest as long as
those bonds conform to the federal regulations on registration.
Moreover, South Carolina may continue to borrow money by issuing
municipal bearer bonds if it is willing to relinquish the
attractive market feature of tax-exempt interest.

/

tolerableT:yt::ee:::::a:h::t::::::~t:::r::~::: :::sm::: :::e

~ survive a lOth Amendment chalienge. Section 310(b) (1) serves the
federal interest in several ways. ~it checks the drain on
federal funds by aiding in the collection of federal taxes.

The

Senate Report observed that "registration will reduce the----"ability
of noncompliant taxpayers to conceal income and property from the
reach of the income, estate, and gift taxes." 1 S. Rep. No. 97494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1982) ~ it will aid the
federal government in combatting illegal activities by destroying
their economic base.

The Senate Report observed that the

registration requirement "may reduce the volume of readily

5As may be expected from two 5-4 results reaching opposite
conclusions, the distinctions are not very convincing.

,

.

I'
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negotiable substitutes for cash available to persons engaged in
illegal activities."

Id. 6

Under the Hodel analysis, §310(b) (1) presents a case
that does not fit comfortably within the decisions in either
National League of Cities or Wyoming.

Considering that both

those cases were 5-4 decisions reaching opposite results, the
distinctions between them are not suprisingly unconvincing.

The

Wyoming decision interpreted National League of Cities as
protecting the states only against those federal intrusions that
might threaten their "separate and independent existence."

In

light of this narrow reading of National League of Cities, and
the fact that §310(b) (1) theoretically does not require that the
states issue only fully registered municipal bonds, I do not
believe that that provision violates the lOth Amendment.

To the

extent that this case differs factually from both National League
of Cities and Wyoming, it presents another opportunity to do
battle over that much embattled amendment.

III. CONCLUSION

As to the jurisdictional issue, I recommend that the
Court either exercise its original jurisdiction under the Antiinjunction Act on the ground that Congress may not limit this
Court's original jurisdiction, or that the Court hold that
6Attacking the economic base of illegal activity is the primary
thrust of the RICO statute.
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application of the Act in this case denies due process.

If the

Court chooses the latter course it should not exercise its
original jurisdiction absent a determination that the delay in
the lower courts would be intolerable to the state bond market.
If the Court chooses the former course, or if it finds that delay
would be intolerable under the latter course, it could appoint a
special master to consider the practical effects of the contested
regulation on the state's power to borrow money.

However, I

believe that even assuming the accuracy of South Carolina's dire
projections, the regulation does not violate the lOth Amendment
under the standards articulated by Hodel and applied in Wyoming.

~

'.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, PLAINTIFF v. DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT

No. 94, Orig.

Decided December-, 1983

delivered the opinion of the Court.
South Carolina invokes the Court's original jurisdiction1
and asks leave to file a complaint against Donald T. Regan,
the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The
state seeks an injunction and other relief, on the ground that
§ 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, is constitutionally invalid as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
The Secretary objects to the motion on the ground that the
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), bars this action2
and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny leave to file. We are not persuaded that either
is a ground for denying the motion, and therefore grant the
motion for leave to file the complaint.
JuSTICE BRENNAN

I

Section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. exempts from a taxpayer's gross income the interest ea ed on
'U. S. Canst., Art. III, § 2; 28 U. S. C. § 1251(b).
Defendant also argues that the Court may not grant decl ratory relief
because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, hich authorizes "any court of the United States" to issue a declaratolJ) judgment in an
appropriate case, excepts from its coverage most "~tio with respect to
Federal taxes." Because of our disposition of the c e, e need n'ot decide
at this time whether we may grant declaratory reli f s ould plaintiff prevail on the merits.
2

1
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the obligations of any State. 3 In 1982, however, as part of
TEFRA, Congress amended § 103 to restrict the types of
bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that section. Specifically, § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA requires that certain obligations, termed "registration-required obligations,"
be issued in registered, 4 rather than bearer, form to qualify
for the § 103(a) exemption. 5 For purposes of § 310(b)(1),
registration-required obligations are defined broadly to include most publicly-issued obligations with maturities
greater than one year. 6 If an obligation that is registrationI.R.C. § 103(a) provides in pertinent part:
"(a) General rule.-Gross income does not include interest on(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District
of Columbia ... "
' Temporary Regulation§ 5f.103-1 provides that:
"An obligation is in registered form if(i) The obligation is registered both as to principal and any stated interest
and transfer of the obligation may be effected only by the surrender of the
old instrument and either the reissuance by the issuer of the old instrument
to the new holder or the issuance by the issuer of a new instrument to the
new holder, or
(ii) The right to the principal of, and stated interest on, the obligation may
be transferred only through a book entry system (as described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section)." 47 Fed. Reg. 51362 (1982).
5
Section 310(b)(l) provides as follows :
"(b) OTHER OBLIGATIONS.(1) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE
TAX-EXEMPT.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain governmental obligations) is amended by ... inserting after subsection (i) the
following new subsection:
'(j) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAXEXEMPT.'(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in subsection (a) or in any other provision of
law shall be construed to provide an exemption from federal income tax for
interest on any registration-required obligation unless the obligation is in
registered form."
6
Section 310(b)(1) defines a registration-required obligation as any obligation other than an obligation that "(A) is not of a type offered to the
8
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required is issued in bearer, rather than registered, form,
then § 310(b)(1) provides that the interest on that obligation
is taxable.
Because the imposition of a tax on bearer obligations would
require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of interest if it issues bearer bonds, South Carolina argues that the
practical effect of§ 310(b)(1) is to require it to issue its obligations in registered form. For that reason, South Carolina
argues that the section destroys its freedom to issue obligations in the form that it chooses. Viewing its borrowing
power as essential to the maintainence of its separate and independent existence, South Carolina contends that the condition imposed by§ 310(b)(l) on the exercise of that power violates the Tenth Amendment. In addition, relying on Pollock
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895),
South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the interest earned on the obligations of a state. Because § 310(b)(1)
imposes a tax on the interest earned on state obligations issued in bearer form, the State argues that the section is unconstitutional. Accordingly, South Carolina asks that its
motion to file the complaint be granted and that this Court
award declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief. 7
The Secretary does not address the merits of the State's
constitutional claims. Rather, he argues that we may not
grant the motion to file because this action is barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act (Act). The Act provides, in pertinent
part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person
public, (B) has a maturity (at issue) of not more than 1 year, or (C) is described in section 163(f)(2)(B)."
7
Since we have decided to appoint a Special Master to develop a factual
record , see infra, at - , we express no opinion on the merits of the
State's claims.
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against whom such tax was assessed." 8 Characterizing this
action as a suit to "restrain[] the assessment or collection of"
a tax, the Secretary contends that this suit is barred by the
statute. The Secretary argues that Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) establishes the
single judicially-created exception to the Act and that the instant action does not fall within that exception. We need not
address whether the instant case falls within the Williams
Packing exception for we hold that the Act was not intended
to bar an action where, as here, Congress has not provided
the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax. 9
II

When enacted in 1867, the forerunner of the current AntiInjunction Act provided that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court." Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 Stat. 475. 10
Although the Act apparently has no recorded legislative history, Bob Jones, supra, at 736, the circumstances of its enactment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to
bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided
the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by
which to contest the legality of a particular tax. For the Act
originated as an amendment to a statute that provided that
8
The full text of the Act reads:
"Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c),
7426(a) and (b) (1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax
was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a).
None of the statutory exceptions is relevant in this case.
9
Because of our disposition of the statutory issue, we need not reach the
state's contention that application of the Act to bar this suit would unconstitutionally restrict this Court's original jurisdiction.
0
' In the revised statutes, the term "any" was added so that the statute
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S.
189, 192 (1883). This language appears in the current version of the Act.
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"No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been
duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue . . .
and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon,
unless such suit shall be brought within six months from
the time of said decision ... " Internal Revenue Act of
July 13th, 1866, § 19, 14 Stat. 152.
The Anti-Injunction Act amended this statute by adding
the Pt;fibition against injunctions. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10,
14 Stat. 475. The Act, therefore, prohibited injunctions in
the context of a statutory scheme that provided an alternative remedy. As we explained in Snyder v. Marks, 109
U. S. 189, 193 (1883), "[t]he remedy of a suit to recover back
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to
restrain its collection is forbidden." This is cogent evidence
that the 1867 amendment was merely intended to require
taxpayers to litigate their claims in a designated proceeding.
The Secretary argues that, regardless of whether other
remedies are available, a plaintiff may only sue to restrain
the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to
the Act enunciated in Williams Packing, supra. Williams
Packing did not, however, ever address, let alone decide, the
question whether the Act applies when Congress has provided no alternative remedy. Indeed, as we shall see, a
careful reading of Williams Packing and its progeny supports our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply in
the absence of such a remedy.
Williams Packing was a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service from collecting
allegedly past-due social security and unemployment taxes.
The Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act would not
apply if the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits,
and (2) could demonstrate that collection would cause him irreparable harm. 370 U. S., at 6-7. Finding that the first
condition had not been met, the Court concluded that the Act

,,

."
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barred the suit. Significantly, however, Congress had provided the plaintiff in Williams Packing with the alternative
remedy of a suit for a refund. I d., at 7.
In each of this Court's subsequent cases that have applied
the Williams Packing rule, the plaintiff had the option of
paying the tax and bringing a suit for a refund. Moreover,
these cases make clear that the Court in Williams Packing
and its progeny did not intend to decide whether the Act
would apply to an aggrieved party who could not bring a suit
for a refund.
For example, in Bob Jones, supra, the taxpayer sought to
prevent the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status
under I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Because the suit would have restrained the collection of income taxes from the taxpayer and
its contributors, as well as the collection of federal social security and unemployment taxes from the taxpayer, the Court
concluded that the suit was an action to restrain "the assessment or collection of any tax" within the meaning of the AntiInjunction Act. 416 U. S., at 738--739. Applying the Williams Packing test, the Court found that the Act barred the
suit because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was
certain to succeed on the merits. Id. at 749. In rejecting
the taxpayer's challenge to the Act on due process grounds,
however, the Court relied on the availability of a refund suit,
noting that "our conclusion might well be different" if the aggrieved party had no access to judicial review. 416 U. S., at
746. Similarly, the Court left open the question whether the
Due Process Clause would be satisfied if an organization had
to rely on a "friendly donor" to obtain judicial review of the
Service's revocation of its tax-exemption. Id., at 747 n. 21. 11
In addition, in Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U. S. 752 (1973), decided the same day as Bob Jones, the
Court considered a taxpayer's action to require the Service to
11

A "friendly donor" suit is a suit in which a donor claims that his contributions to an organization should be tax deductible because the organization's tax-exempt status had been revoked improperly.
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reinstate its tax-exempt status. 12 The Court applied the
Williams Packing test and held that the action was barred
by the Act. Finally, in United States v. American Friends
Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam), the taxpayers sought to enjoin the Government from requiring that
a portion of their wages be withheld. The taxpayers argued
that the withholding provisions violated their First Amendment right to bear witness to their religious beliefs. The
Court again applied the Williams Packing rule and found
that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In both
of these cases, the taxpayers argued that the Williams Packing test was irrelevant and the Act inapplicable because they
did not have adequate alternative remedies. In rejecting
this argument, the Court expressly relied on the availability
of refund suits. 416 U. S., at 761; 419 U. S., at 11. This
emphasis on alternative remedies would have been irrelevant
had the Court meant to decide that the Act applied in the absence of such remedies. We therefore turn to that question.
The analysis in Williams Packing and its progeny of the
purposes of the Act provides significant support for our holding today. Williams Packing expressly stated that the Act
was intended to protect tax revenues from judicial interference "and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums
be determined in a suit for a refund." 370 U. S., at 7 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court concluded that the Act
was also designed as "protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for a refund," id. at 7-8 (emphasis
added). The Court's concerns with protecting the expeditious collection of revenue and protecting the collector from
In Americans United, the IRS had revoked the organization's
Although the organization's income remained tax exempt, "the effect of this
change in status was to render respondent liable for unemployment
(FUTA) taxes under the Code § 3301, 26 U. S. C. § 3301, and to destroy its
eligibility for tax deductible contributions under § 170." I d. at 755 (footnote omitted).
12

§ 501(c)(3) status, but found that it was eligible for § 501(c)(4) status.
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litigation were expressed in the context of a procedure that
afforded the taxpayer the remedy of a refund suit.
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the 1966 amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act. In 1966, in § 110(c) of the
Federal Tax Lien Act, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125,
Congress amended the Anti-Injunction Act to read, in pertinent part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court, by any person whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." I d., § 110(c), 80
Stat. 1144. The central focus of the added phrase, "by any
person whether or not such person is the person against
whom such tax was assessed," was on third parties whose
property rights competed with federal tax liens. Bob Jones,
supra, at 732 n. 6. Prior to the adoption of the Tax Lien
Act, such parties were often unable to protect their property
interests. I d.; H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
27-28 (1966). 13 Section 110(a) of the Tax Lien Act gave such
third parties a right of action against the United States. 14
The amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was largely designed to insure that the right of action granted by § 110(a) of
the Federal Tax Lien Act was exclusive. 416 U. S., at 732
n. 6. The language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the
Any dicta in Bob Jones suggesting that the Anti-Injunction Act barred
such third-party suits may be disregarded. 416 U. S., at 732 n. 6. The
Act had been widely construed not to apply to actions by third parties
claiming that a federal tax lien impaired their property rights. See, e. g.,
Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F. 2d 28 (CA5 1960); Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.
2d 808 (CA71942); American Bar Association, Final Report of the Committee on Federal Liens, at 48, 116, reprinted in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
14
Section 110(a) provides in pertinent part:
"If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to
a levy, any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax
out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil
action against the United States in a district court of the United States."
13

,I
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1966 amendment is, therefore, simply irrelevant to the issue
before us today. 15
In sum, the Act's purpose and the circumstances of its enactment indicate that Congress merely intended the Act to
limit aggrieved parties to specified remedies. The Act cannot, of course, serve this purpose when Congress has provided no alternative remedy. We conclude, therefore, that
the Act does not apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom Congress has not provided an alternative
forum in which to litigate their claims. 16 In this case, if the
In Bob Jones, we held that the 1966 amendment did not merely limit
the remedies of third parties challenging federal tax liens. Rather, the
amendment was also intended as a reaffirmation of the plain language of
the Act. Ibid. In that sense, we found the statute to be "declaratory"
rather than "innovative." Ibid. Because the Act, as originally enacted,
did not cover third parties who were not given an alternative action in
which to press their claims, our construction of the 1966 amendment in Bob
Jones is entirely consistent with our holding today.
Similarly, we stated in Americans United that "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyone's taxes triggers the literal terms" of the Act.
416 U. S., at 760. Of course, this statement was meant to apply only if the
aggrieved party has an alternative remedy.
16
As the Secretary notes, I.R.C. § 7478 does not provide plaintiff with
an action in which he may contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(1). That
section permits the Tax Court to, "make a declaration whether ... prospective obligations are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case
involves the constitutionality of section 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds
that the State desires to issue are "described in section 103." Therefore,
section 7478 does not provide the State with an alternative procedure to •
contest the legality of section 310(b)(l).
We are aware that there are statements in the legislative history of I.R.C.
§ 7478, indicating that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of
that section, prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the
interest on their bonds would be tax exempt. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1263,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1978) (noting that, as a practical matter, state
and local governments could not appeal from an adverse private letter ruling on the taxability of a proposed issue). To the extent that these statements may be read as expressing the view that the Anti-Injunction Act
would bar suits by prospective issuers regardless of the availablility of an
alternative remedy, they are the views of a subsequent Congress and
16
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plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders
will, by virtue of§ 310(b)(l) of TEFRA, be liable for the tax
on the interest earned on those bonds. South Carolina will
incur no tax liability. Under these circumstances, the State
will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest
the constitutionality of § 310(b)(l). Accordingly, the Act
cannot bar this action.
The Secretary suggests that the State may obtain judicial
review of its claims by issuing bearer bonds and urging a purchaser of those bonds to bring a suit contesting the legality of
§ 310(b)(l). But the nature of this proposed remedy only
buttresses our conclusion that the Act was not intended to
apply to this kind of action. First, instances in which a third
party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the
exception rather than the rule. Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U. S. 106, 114 (1975). More important, to make use of this
remedy the State "must first be able to find [an individual]
willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the
Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the relevant
arguments on [its] behalf." Bob Jones, supra, at 747 n. 21.
Because it is by no means certain that the State would be
able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, 17 reliance on
the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create the risk
that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State
of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims. For these
reasons, we should not lightly attribute to Congress an intent
to require plaintiff to find a third party to contest its claims.
Here, the indicia of congressional intent-the Act's purposes
therefore, at best, "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U. S. 102, 117 (1979), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304,
313 (1960). Whatever weight these statements may be entitled to, they
are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other evidence of congressional
intent discussed above.
17
It is not irrelevant that the IRS routinely audits the returns of taxpayers who litigate claims for refunds. Department of the Treasury, Chief
Counsel's Directives Manual (35)(17)50.
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and the circumstances of its enactment-demonstrate that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved
party would be required to depend on the mere possibility of
persuading a third party to assert his claims. Rather, the
Act was intended to apply only when Congress has provided
an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its
claims on its own behalf. Because Congress did not prescribe an alternative remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the
Act does not bar this suit.

III
The Secretary argues that if we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act is not a bar to this suit, we should in any event
exercise our discretion to deny leave to file. He notes that
the Court's jurisdiction over this suit is not exclusive and that
the Court exercises its "original jurisdiction sparingly and [is]
particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the
plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his
claim." United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1972)
(per curiam). The State has, however, alleged that the
application of § 310(b)(1) will "materially interfere with and
infringe upon the authority of South Carolina to borrow
funds." Motion for Leave to File Complaint, p. 7; see supra,
at--. Additionally, twenty-three States have jointly submitted an amicus brief urging this Court to grant the motion
to file. Unquestionably, the manner in which a State may
exercise its borrowing power is a question that is of vital importance to all fifty States. Under these circumstances, we
believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise its discretion
in favor of hearing this case. At present, however, the
record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address
the merits. We shall therefore appoint a Special Master to
develop the record.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a complaint
is granted and a Special Master will be appointed.
It is so ordered.
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, PLAINTIFF v. DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
OF THE UNITED STATES
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT

No. 94, Orig.

Decided December-, 1983

delivered the opinion of the Court.
South Carolina invokes the Court's original jurisdiction 1
and asks h:iave to file a complaint against Donald T. Regan,
the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The
state seeks an injunction and other relief, on the ground that
§ 310(b)(l) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, is constitutionally invalid as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
The Secretary objects to the motion on the ground that the
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), bars this action2
and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny leave to file. We are not persuaded that either
is a ground for denying the motion, and therefore grant the
motion for leave to file the complaint.
--JUSTICE BRENNAN

I
Section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) exempts from a taxpayer's gross income the interest earned on
'U. S. Canst. , Art. III, § 2; 28 U. S. C. § 1251(b).
Defendant also argues that the Court may not grant declaratory relief
because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201 , which authorizes "any court of the United States" to issue a declaratory judgment in an
appropriate case, excepts from its coverage most "actions with respect to
Federal taxes." Because of our disposition of the case, we need not decide
at this time whether we may grant declaratory relief should plaintiff prevail on the merits.
2

No. 94, Orig.-Opinion
2

SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN

the obligations of any State. 3 In 1982, however, as part of
TEFRA, Congress amended § 103 to restrict the types of
bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that section.
pecifically, § 310(b)(l) of TEFRA requires that certain obligations, termed "registration-required obligations,"
be issued in registered, 4 rather than bearer, form to qualify
for the § 103(a) exemption. 5 For purposes of § 310(b)(l),
registration-required obligations are defined broadly to include most publicly-issued obligations with maturities
greater than one year. 6 If an obligation that is registration• I.R.C. § 103(a) provides in pertinent part:
"(a) General rule.-Gross income does not include interest on(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District
of Columbia ... "
'Temporary Regulation § 5f.103-1 provides that:
"An obligation is in registered form if(i) The obligation is registered both as to principal and any stated interest
and transfer of the obligation may be effected only by the surrender of the
old instrument and either the reissuance by the issuer of the old instrument
to the new holder or the issuance by the issuer of a new instrument to the
new holder, or
(ii) The right to the principal of, and stated interest on, the obligation may
be transferred only through a book entry system (as described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section)." 47 Fed. Reg. 51362 (1982).
• Section 310(b)(1) provides as follows:
"(b) OTHER OBLIGATIONS.(1) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE
TAX-EXEMPT.-Section 103 (relating to interest on certain governmental obligations) is amended by ... inserting after subsection (i) the
following new subsection:
'(j) OBLIGATIONS MUST BE IN REGISTERED FORM TO BE TAXEXEMPT.'(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in subsection (a) or in any other provision of
law shall be construed to provide an exemption from federal income tax for
interest on any registration-required obligation unless the obligation is in
registered form."
• Section 310(b)(1) defines a registration-required obligation as any obligation other than an obligation that "(A) is not of a type offered to the
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required is issued in bearer, rather than registered, form,
then § 310(b)(1) provides that the interest on that obligation
is taxable.
Because the im.Qosition ~x on bearer obligations would
require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of intere~ it issues bearer-bonds, South Carolina argues that the
practical effect of§ 310(b)(l) is to require it to issue its obligations in registered form. For tnatreason, South Carolina
argues that the section destroys its freedom to issue obligations in the form that it chooses. Viewing its borrowing
power as essential to the maintainence of its separate and independent existence, South Carolina contends that the condition imposed by § 310(b)(1) on the exercise of that power violates the Tenth Amendment. In addition, relying on Pollock
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895),
South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the interest earned on the obligations of a state. Because § 310(b)(1)
imposes a tax on the interest earned on state obligations issued in bearer form, the State argues that the section is unconstitutional. Accordingly, South Carolina asks that its
motion to file the complaint be granted and that this Court
award declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief. 7
The Secretary does not address the merits of the State's
constitutional claiiii8.' Rather, he argues that we may not
grant flie motion to file because this action is barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act (Act). The Act provides, in pertinent
part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person
public, (B) has a maturity (at issue) of not more than 1 year, or (C) is described in section 163(f)(2)(B)."
7
Since we have decided to appoint a Special Master to develop a factual
, we express no opinion on the merits of the
record, see infra, at State's claims.
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against whom such tax was assessed." 8 Characterizing this
action as a suit to "restrain[] the assessment or collection of"
a tax, the Secretary contends that this suit is barred by the
statute. The Secretary argues that Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) establishes the
single judicially-created exception to the Act and that the instant action does not fall within that exception. We need not
address whether the instant case falls within the Williams
Packing exception for we hold that the Act was not intended
to bar an action wher~ere, Congressjias not provided
the plamtii'f with an a1ternative legal way t OCiiallenge the validit y of a tttx.s II
When enacted in 1867, the forerunner of the current AntiInjunction Act provided that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court." ActofMar. 2,1867, §10, 14Stat. 475. 10
Although the Act apparently has no recorded legislative history, Bob Jones, supra, at 736, the circumstances of its enactment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to
bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided
the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by
which to contest the legality of a particular tax. For the Act
originated as an amendment to a statute that provided that
The full text of the Act reads:
"Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c),
7426(a) and (b) (1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax
was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a).
None of the statutory exceptions is relevant in this case.
9
Because of our disposition of the statutory issue, we need not reach the
state's contention that application of the Act to bar this suit would unconstitutionally restrict this Court's original jurisdiction.
0
' In the revised statutes, the term "any" was added so that the statute
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks , 109 U. S.
189, 192 (1883). This language appears in the current version of the Act.
8
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"No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been
duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue ...
and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon,
unless such suit shall be brought within six months from
the time of said decision ... " Internal Revenue Act of
July 13th, 1866, § 19, 14 Stat. 152.
The Anti-Injunction Act amended this statute by adding
the prhioihon agaillsi InJUnctions. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10,
14 ~ The Act, therefore, prohibited injunctions in
the context of a statutory scheme that provided an alternative remedy. As we explained in Snyder v. Marks, 109
U. S. 189, 193 (1883), "[t]he remedy of a suit to recover back
the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to
restrain its collection is forbidden." This is cogent evidence
that the 1867 amendment was merely intended to re uire
taxpayers o 1 1gate their claims m a esi ated roceeding.
e ecretary argues that, regar ess of whether other
remedies are available, a plaintiff may only sue to restrain
the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to
the Act enunciated in Williams Packing, supra. Williams
Packing did not, however, ever address, let alone decide, the
question whether the Act applies when Congress has provided no alternative remedy. Indeed, as we shall see, a
careful reading of Williams Packing and its progeny supports our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply in
the absence of such a remedy.
Williams Packing was a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service from collecting
allegedly past-due social security and unemployment taxes.
The Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act would not
apply if the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits,
and (2) could demonstrate that collection would cause him irreparable harm. 370 U. S., at ~7. Finding that the first
condition had not been met, the Court concluded that the Act

J
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barred the suit. Significantly, however, Congress had provided the plaintiff in Williams Packing with the alternative
remedy of a suit for a refund. /d., at 7.
"""ileach of this Court's subsequent cases that have applied
the Williams Packing rule, the plaintiff had the option of
paying the tax and bringing a suit for a refund. Moreover,
these cases make clear that the Court in Williams Packing
and its progeny did not intend to decide whether the Act
would apply to an aggrieved party who could not bring a suit
for a refund.
For example, ir(B}b Jones} supra, the taxpayer sought to
prevent the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status
under I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Because the suit would have restrained the collection of income taxes from the taxpayer and
its contributors, as well as the collection of federal social security and unemployment taxes from the taxpayer, the Court
concluded that the suit was an action to restrain "the assessment or collection of any tax" within the meaning of the AntiInjunction Act. 416 U. S., at 738-739. Applying the Williams Packing test, the Court found that the Act barred the
suit because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was
certain to succeed on the merits. Id. at 749. In rejecting
the taxpayer's challenge to the Act on due process grounds,
however, the Court relied on the availability of a refund suit,
noting that "our conclusiOn might well be different" if the aggrieved party had no access to judicial review. 416 U. S., at
746. Similarly, the Court left open the question whether the
Due Process Clause would be satisfied if an organization had
to rely on a "friendly donor" to obtain judicial review of the
Service's revocation of its tax-exemption. /d., at 747 n. 2 .n
In addition, in Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U. S. 752 (1973), decided the same day as Bob Jones, the
Court considered a taxpayer's action to require the Service to
A "friendly donor" suit is a suit in which a donor claims that his contributions to an organization should be tax deductible because the organization's tax-exempt status had been revoked improperly.
11
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reinstate its tax-exempt status. 12 The Court applied the
Williams Packing test and held that the action was barred
by the Act. Finally, in United States v. American Friends
Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam), the taxpayers sought to enjoin the Government from requiring that
a portion of their wages be withheld. The taxpayers argued
that the withholding provisions violated their First Amendment right to bear witness to their religious beliefs. The
Court again applied the Williams Packing rule and found
that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In both
oft._hese cases, the t~payers argued that the Williams PaCking test was irrelevant anaffie :Act inapplicable because they
did ~ate alternative remedies. In rejecting
xpress y re 1ed on the availability
this argumen , e ou
of refund suits. 416 U. S., at 761; 419 U. S., at 11. This
emphasis on alternative remedies would have been irrelevant
had the Court meant to decide that the Act applied in the absence of such remedies. We therefore turn to that question.
The analysis in Williams Packing and its progeny of the
purposes of the Act provides significant support for our holding today. Williams Packing expressly stated that the Act
was intended to protect tax revenues from judicial interference "and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums
be determined in a suit for a refund." 370 U. S., at 7 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court concluded that the Act
was also designed as "protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for a refund," id. at 7-8 (emphasis
added). The Court's concerns with protecting the expeditious collection of revenue and protecting the collector from
12
In Americans United, the IRS had revoked the organization's
§ 501(c)(3) status, but found that it was eligible for § 501(c)(4) status. Although the organization's income remained tax exempt, "the effect of this
change in status was to render respondent liable for unemployment
(FUTA) taxes under the Code§ 3301, 26 U. S. C. § 3301, and to destroy its
eligibility for tax deductible contributions under § 170." I d. at 755 (footnote omitted) .

..
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litigation were expressed in the context of a procedure that
afforded the taxpayer the remedy of a refund suit.
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the 1966 amendment to theAlltl-In] unctfon Act-:--' In 196~in § 110(c) of the
Federal Tax Lie'iiA:ct , PUb. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125,
Congress amended the Anti-Injunction Act to read, in pertinent part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court, by any person whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." Id., § 110(c), 80
Stat. 1144. The central focus of the added phrase, "by any
person whether or not such person 1s the person against
whom such tax was assessed," was on third parties whose
property rights competed with federal tax liens. Bob Jones,
supra, at 2 n. .
rwr o e a op Ion of the Tax Lien
Act, such parties were often unable to protect their property
interests. I d.; H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
27-28 (1966). 13 Section 110(a) of the Tax Lien Act gave such
third parties a right of action against the United States. 14
The amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was largely desigr;ed !.2_ ins~11!!f ~~ r igilt of act~on granted 6y § 110(a) of
the Federal Tax Lien ACt was exc1usive. 416 U. S., at 732
n. 6. The language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the
13
Any dicta in Bob Jones suggesting that the Anti-Injunction Act barred
such third-party suits may be disregarded. 416 U. S., at 732 n. 6. The
Act had been widel construed not to apply to actions b third arties
clmmm that a ederal tax lien impaire t eir propert rights. See, e. g.,
Campbe v. agley, 276 F. 2d 28 ( A 1960); Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.
2d 808 (CA 7 1942); American Bar Association, Final Report of the Committee on Federal Liens, at 48, 116, reprinted in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. , 2d Sess. (1966).
14
Section 110(a) provides in pertinent part:
"If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to
a levy, any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax
out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil
action against the United States in a district court of the United States."
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1966 amendment is, therefore, simply irrelevant to the issue
before us today.' 5
In sum, the Act's purpose and the circumstances of its enactment indicate that Congress merely intended the Act to
limit aggrieved parties to specifiedremeoies. The Act canno , o course, serve IS purP. e
en Congress has provided no alternative remedy.
e conclud therefore, that
the Act does not apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties . . for w1iom Congress has not provided an alternative
foru
n t is case, if the
'"In Bob Jones, we held that the 1966 amendment did not merely limit
the remedies of third parties challenging federal tax liens. Rather, the
amendment was also intended as a reaffirmation of the plain language of
the Act. Ibid. In that sense, we found the statute to be "declaratory"
rather than "innovative." Ibid. Because the Act, as originally enacted,
did not cover third parties who were not given an alternative action in
which to press their claims, our construction of the 1966 amendment in Bob
Jones is entirely consistent with our holding today.
Similarly, we stated in Americans United that "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyone's taxes triggers the literal terms" of the Act.
416 U. S., at 760. Of course, this statement was meant to apply only if the
aggrieved party has an alternative remedy.
16
As the Secretary notes, I.R.C. § 7478 does not provide plaintiff with
an action in which he may contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(l). That
section permits the Tax Court to, "make a declaration whether . . . prospective obligations are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case
involves the constitutionality of section 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds
that the State desires to issue are "described in section 103." Therefore,
section 7478 does not provide the State with an alternative procedure to
contest the legality of section 310(b)(1).
We are aware that there are statements in the legislative history of I.R.C.
§ 7478, indicating that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of
that section, prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the
interest on their bonds would be tax exempt. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1263,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1978) (noting that, as a practical matter, state
and local governments could not appeal from an adverse private letter ruling on the taxability of a proposed issue). To the extent that these statements may be read as expressing the view that the Anti-Injunction Act
would bar suits by prospective issuers regardless of the availablility of an
alternative remedy, they are the views of a subsequent Congress and
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plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders
will, by virtue of§ 310(b)(l) of TEFRA, be liable for the tax
on the interest earned on those bonds. South Carolina will
incur no tax liability. Under these circumstances, the State
will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest
the constitutionality of § 310(b)(l). Accordingly, the Act
cannot bar this action.
The Secretary suggests that the State may obtain judicial
review of its claims by issuing bearer bonds and urging a purchaser of those bonds to bring a suit contesting the legality of
§ 310(b)(1). But the nature of this proposed remedy only
buttresses our conclusion that the Act was not intended to
apply to this kind of action. First, instances in which a third
party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the
exception rather than the rule. Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U. S. 106, 114 (1975). More important, to make use of this
remedy the State "must first be able to find [an individual]
willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the
Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the relevant
arguments on [its] behalf." Bob Jones, supra, at 747 n. 21.
Because it is by no means certain that the State would be
able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, 17 reliance on
the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create the risk
that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State
of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims. For these
reasons, we should not lightly attribute to Congress an intent
to require plaintiff to find a third party to contest its claims.
Here, the indicia of congressional intent-the Act's purposes
therefore, at best, "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U. S. 102, 117 (1979), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304,
313 (1960). Whatever weight these statements may be entitled to, they
are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other evidence of congressional
intent discussed above.
17
It is not irrelevant that the IRS routinely audits the returns of taxpayers who litigate claims for refunds. Department of the Treasury, Chief
Counsel's Directives Manual (35)(17)50.
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and the circumstances of its enactment-demonstrate that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved
party would be required to depend on the mere possibility of
persuading a third party to assert his claims. Rather, the
Act was intended to apply only when Congress has provided
an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its
claims on its own behalf. Because Congress did not prescribe an alternative remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the
Act does not bar this suit.

III
The Secretary argues that if we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act is not a bar to this suit, we should in any event
exercise our discretion to deny leave to file. He notes that
the Court's jurisdiction over this suit is not exclusive and that
the Court exercises its "original jurisdiction sparingly and [is]
particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the
plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his
claim." United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1972)
(per curiam). The State has, however, alleged that the
application of § 310(b)(1) will "materially interfere with and
infringe upon the authority of South Carolina to borrow
funds." Motion for Leave to File Complaint, p. 7; see supra,
at--. Additionally, twenty-three States have jointly submitted an amicus brief urging this Court to grant the motion
to file. Unquestionably, the manner in which a State may
exercise its borrowing power is a question that is of vital importance to all fifty States. Under these circumstances, we
believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise its discretion
in favor of hearing this case. At present, however, the
record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address
the merits. We shall therefore appoint a Special Master to
develop the record.
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a complaint
is granted and a Special Master will be appointed.
It is so ordered.
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No. 94 Orig.

South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Bill,
I continue to be concerned about holding that the AntiInjunction Act is inapplicable in situations where the aggrie3ed
parties have no otner remed1es. -rt seems to me various ~ potential
plaint1ff:S,~s~ax e-xempt organizations, pay no direct taxes
and cannot bring suits for refunds. Nevertheless, I had thought
Congress made a judgment that only actual taxpayers should be
able to litigate the propriety of a tax assessment, and that such
litigation should be limited to suits for refunds. Indeed,
Congress has previously recognized the dilemma that the AntiInjunction Act creates for such parties and has given relief in
( at least one instance.
For example, in 1978, precisely because "the present
law does not allow the state or local government to go to court,"
s. Rep. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 533 (1978), Congress
provided that issuers of state and municipal bonds could seek
declaratory judgments about the status of certain prospective
obligations. lRC § 7478. It seems to me that such post-enactment
legislative history is reliable and should help guide our
interpretation.
I agree with your final judgment, however, because
Congress cannot prevent this Court from entertaining a
constitutional challenge to a tax statute under our original
jurisdiction. It might also be possible to hold that Congress
did not intend the Anti-Injunction Act to apply to original
actions brought by states in this Court.
In due course, I will circulate a concurrence in the
judgment.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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Justice Brennan
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December 14, 1983

Re:

94 Original - South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Bill:
Although I will join Parts I and II of the
opinion, I remain persuaded that we should not grant
leave to file because there is simply no merit
whatsoever in the State's claim. I will write this out
as soon as I can.
Respectfully,

)'IL
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

December lS, 1983
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Justice BrPnnan
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94 Orig. South Carolina v. Regan (Cammie)%
WJB for the Court 10/7/83
1st draft 12/13/83
Joined by TM 12/13/83
SOC will concur in judgment 12/13/83
JPS joins Parts I and II, will write 12/14/83
WHR awaiting SOC's concurrence 12/14/83
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December 19, 1983

94 Orig . South Carolina v . Regan

Dear Bill:
In mv Jetter of December 15, T T(listak.enly saio I
was awaiting ~ di~sent from Bill R~hnquist.
I certainly agree with your iu~gment. My concern
is whether we need go beyond holding that the AntiJniunction Act does not limit the exercise of our original
jnrisd;ction.
I
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Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

concurrence .
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December 19, 1983

Re:
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Dear Bill,
I am awaiting other writing in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE

w...

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Sandra,
I just returned to town to find your letter regarding this
case. I appreciate your views and am looking forward to seeing
what you come up with. At conference, a number of reasonable
ways to reach the conclusion that the Act does not bar this suit
were advanced. In thinking through the case, I realized that
none of these approaches -- including the one I have proposed -is entirely without its problems. Although I continue to believe
that the Act was not intended to apply when there is no other
remedy, and that a contrary interpretation would raise serious
constitutional difficulties, it may be that your approach is a
reasonable one that would permit us to leave that question for
a not her day.
I note, however, that there is one practical problem with
holding that the Act does not apply to this Court. I am
concerned that such a holding would invite a spate of lawsuits by
States invoking our original jurisdiction to litigate tax
matters. Holding that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply in
this Court, but does apply in other courts when there is no
alternative remedy, would be particularly troublesome. Were a
State to file a suit in this Court claiming that it had no access
to any other court, I would think that, at a minimum, we would be
required to take a hard look at the issues presented before
declining to hear the case. Indeed, in some of these cases,
because of the absence of an alternative remedy, it would be an
abuse of discretion for us to deny leave to file. See Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 u.s. 725, 740 (1980) (whether it TSappropriate
to deny leave to file depends on the seriousness of the claim and
the availability of another forum).
If you can allay my concern in this regard, I do not think
that I would be likely to take issue with a holding that the Act

does not apply to this Court, as long as the question whether the
Act applies in other courts in the absence of an alternative
remedy were left open.
Sincerely,

0~1/ /lt:
W.J.B., Jr.

Justice 0' Connor
Copies to the Conference
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our original jurisdiction raises three questions. (!irsQ the ~
Court must decide whether Congress intended by the Tax ~o-f
Anti-Injunction Act (Act), 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), to bar
nontaxpayers like the State of South Carolina from challeng- ~ / ~ 2u.-j;,
ing the validity of federal tax statutes in the courts.
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97-248, 96 Stat. 596, raises issues appropriate for original ad- ~
a_
judication.
,h1~ _,Jit:?_,_.
~ ~
In answering the first question, the Court reaches the up.- /)~·L ~ . ~warranted conclusion that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act pro'~.
~~~ ' 'scnbes only those suits-rn-wrlich tlie complainiii~ Qa,rty, usu..../ -r f l
ally a taxpayer, can challenge the validity of a taxing
t-v -,--r~ ·
~ ~
~easur_e in an alternative foruJ!_l. The Court o s t a . s~ts
)/ 9
·· by nontaxpayers generally are not barred. In my opm10n,
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congressional anti-injunction policy. Accordingly, I cannot
join its opinion.
I
A
The Tax Anti-Injunction Act provides, in pertinent part,
that "no suit fort1ie pur-pQSe of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any C.IDirt by any
person, whether or not such person is the- person against
whom such tax was assessed." 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). The
Act's language "could scarcely be more explicit" in prohibiting nontaxpayer suits like this one, Bob Jones University v.
Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 736 (1974), since the suit indisputably
would have the purpose and effect of restraining taxes. See
id., at 738-742. The Act plainly bars not only "a taxpayer's
attempt to enjoin the collection of his own taxes, ... " but
.also "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyon[e]
[else's] taxes .... " Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U. S. 752, 760 (1974). Though the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) contains a few exceptions to this nearly complete ban, 1 for the most part Congress has restricted the judicial role to resolution of concrete disputes over specific
sums of money, either by way of a deficiency proceeding in
the Tax Court, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 6212, 6213, or by way of a
taxpayer's suit for refund, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 6532, 7422.
In depriving courts of jurisdiction to resolve abstract tax
controversies, Congress has determined that the United
States must be able "to assess and collect taxes alleged to be
due without judicial intervention .... " Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1, 7 (1962).
"[T]axes are the life-blood of government," Bull v. United
States, 295 U. S. 247, 259 (1935), and the anti-injunction prohibition is Congress' recognition that "the tenacity of the
American taxpayer" constantly threatens to drain the nation
of a life-sustaining infusion of revenues. See Gorovitz, Fed1

See infra, at,..,)ijlll!t (describing some exceptions); see also 26 U. S. C.

§§ 6694(c), 7429(b) .
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eral Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases, 10 Taxes
The Act's proscription literally extends to
nontaxpayer as well as taxpayer suits, if only to prevent taxpayers from sidestepping the anti-injunction policy by bringing suit through non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers. 2
Moreover, by broadly precluding both taxpayer and nontaxpayer suits, the Act serves a collateral objective of protecting
"the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund."
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., supra, at
7-8. The tax collector is an attractive target for all kinds of
litigation, see, e. g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), and the Act ensures that only Congress and the Treasury, not a host of private plaintiffs, will determine the focus of the collector's energies.
B
The Act's history expressly reflects the congressional desire that all injunctive suits against the tax collector be prohibited. First enacted in 1867, 3 it apparently was designed
to protect the federal tax system from being inundated with
the same type of injunctive suits that were then sweeping
over the state tax systems. See State Railroad Tax Cases,
446, 446 (1932).

2

Non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers and nontaxpayer organizations previously have attempted to avoid the congressional policy against
judicial resolution of abstract tax controversies. See, e. g., Investment
Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F. 2d 1 (CADC 1979) (insurers seeking
declaration that certain investment annuity contracts are eligible for favorable tax treatment); Educo, Inc., v. Alexander, 557 F. 2d 617 (CA7 1977)
(company engaged in designing and administering educational benefit plans
for corporate employees sues to protect its clients' tax benefits); Cattle
Feeders Tax Committee v. Shultz, 504 F. 2d 462 (CAlO 1974) (unincorporated association representing participants in tax shelter cattle feed program seeking injunction to prevent Treasury from disallowing certain
year-end deductions); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 n. 25
(DC 1972) (nontaxpayer challenge to tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory fraternal organization), disapproved in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 732, and n. 6 (1974).
8
See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 Stat. 475.
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92 U. S. 575, 613 (1876); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189,
193-194 (1883). There is little contemporaneous documentation,4 but this Court's decisions indicate that the 39th Congress acted with a:
"... sense of ... the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of collecting the taxes on which the government depends for
its continued existence." State Railroad Tax Cases,
supra, at 613.
The experience in the states demonstrated the grave dangers
which accompany intrusion of the injunctive power of the
courts into the administration of the revenue:
"If there existed in the courts . . . any general power
of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the power of a
hostile judiciary." Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S.
85, 89 (1876).
To avoid avoid these evils and to safeguard the federal tax
system, the 39th Congress committed administration of the
Code to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. 5
'The Act was introduced on March 1, 1867, by Mr. Fessenden, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, as an amendment to a section
which made a taxpayer appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a
condition precedent to suit for the recovery of taxes. See Congressional
Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, p. 1933 (proposing amendment to the
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 152, presently codified at 26
U. S. C. § 6532(a)). The House initially objected to this amendment, see
Congressional Globe, supra, p. 1949, but the Senate would not recede, id.,
at 1950. After a conference, the House agreed to the amendment. See
id., at 1968. No other recorded legislative history has been uncovered.
See Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109, and n. 9 (1935).
6
The circumstances of the enactment do not, as the Court suggests, see
ante, at 4-5, indicate that Congress meant to prohibit injunctions only
where the statutory scheme provided an alternative remedy. Rather,
"[s]ince equitable principles militating against the issuance of federal in-
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This broad anti-injunction ban remained essentially untouched for almost a century. 6 In 1966, however, Congress
took steps to "reaffirm the plain meaning of the original language of the Act." Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U. S. 752, 760, and n. 11 (1974). In§ 110(c) of the Federal Tax Lien Act, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125, Congress amended the Act to emphasize that no injunctive action
"by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed" could be maintained in
the courts. !d., § 110(c), 80 Stat. 1144 (emphasis added).
The Treasury Department proposed the 1966 amendment,
and its principal spokesperson, Assistant Secretary Surrey,
testified that:
"Subsection (c) of section 110 of the bill amends section
7421(a) of the code. That section presently prohibits injunctions against the assessment or collection of tax.
The cases decided under this provision raise a question
as to whether this prohibition applies against actions by
persons other than the taxpayer. New section 7426 will
specifically allow actions by third parties to enjoin the
enforcement of a levy or sale of property. The amendment to section 7421 makes clear that third parties may
bring injunction suits only under the circumstances provided in new section 7426(b)(1) of the code." Statement
junctions in tax cases existed independently of the Anti-Injunction Act, it
is most unlikely that Congress would have chosen the stringent language of
the Act if its purpose was merely to restate existing law and not to compel
litigants to make use solely of the avenues of review opened by Congress."
Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, 426 U. S., at 742-743, n. 16.
'"Enacted in 1867, [the Anti-Injunction Act], for more than sixty years,
[was] consistently applied as precluding relief, whatever the equities alleged."' ld., at 745, n. 18 (quoting Miller v. Standard Nut Margerine
Co., 284 U. S. 498, 511 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
• In the revised statutes, the term "any'' was added so that the statute
read: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S.
189, 192 (1883).
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by the Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, reprinted in Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290,
89th Cong., 2d Sess."58 (1966).
The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Committee on Finance apparently shared Mr. Surrey's understanding of the rights of nontaxpayers under prior law,
for their reports both state:
"Under present law, ... the United States cannot be
sued by third persons where its collection activities interfere with their property rights. This includes cases
where the Government wrongfully levies on one person's
property in attempting to collect from a taxpayer.
However, some courts allow suits to be brought against
district directors of Internal Revenue where this occurs." H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.A-27
(1966); S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess."'-29 (1966).
To accomodate these conflicting rights, both committees recommended that Congress enact § 7426, allowing "persons
other than taxpayers" to bring suits against the United
States to protect pre-existing liens on property levied upon
by the Treasury, and amend § 7421(a) to forbid suits by all
third persons, excepting those within the ambit of new
§ 7426. Congress followed the committees' recommendations, on the understanding that the new language in
§ 7421(a) was "declaratory, not innovative." Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, 416 U. S., at 731-732, n. 6. 7
I am at a complete loss to understand the Court's assertion that the
"language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the 1966 amendment is ...
simply irrelevant to the issue before us today." Ante, at 8-9. This conclusion follows only if the Court begins with a premise that it need pay no
attention to either the 1966 amendment's language or its legislative history.
Similarly, I do not believe, as the Court apparently does, see ante, at nn.
13, 15, that statements in Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, to the
effect that the Act bars third-party suits, can or should be "disregarded."
7

"
)
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Congress has since relaxed the statutory proscription
against third-party suits on several occasions. For example,
in 1974, it provided that certain designated persons could obtain declaratory judgments in the Tax Court with respect to
the tax status of pension plans. See 26 U. S. C. § 7476.
Similarly, in 1976, because "[u]nder [prevailing] law no court
review of [Internal Revenue Service] ruling[s] [was] available," S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. II, p. 463 (1976), Congress provided declaratory judgment procedures for determining the
tax status of charitable organizations and of certain property
transfers. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 7428, 7477; see also S. Rep.
No. 94-938, supra, pp. 523-524 ("Under present law, the Tax
Court can hear declaratory judgment suits only on the tax
status of employee retirement plans. In no other case may
an individual or an organization seek a declaratory judgment
as to an organization's tax-exempt status."). Finally, in
1978, in 26 U. S. C. § 7478, Congress provided a mechanism
whereby State or local governments could seek declaratory
judgments as to the tax status of proposed municipal bond issuances. 8 The relevant Senate Report noted that:
"As a practical matter, there is no effective appeal
from a Service private letter ruling (or failure to issue a
private letter ruling) that a proposed issue of municipal
bonds is taxable. In those cases, although there may be
a real controversy between a State or local government
Those statements were made after studious interpretation of both the original Act and its 1966 amendment. They reflect what I believe is the only
faithful reading of the statute's language and history.
8
Section 7478 does not directly apply to this case because it permits the
Tax Court only to "make a declaration whether ... prospective obligations
are described in section 103(a)." The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of § 310(b)(1), not whether the bonds South Carolina desires
to issue are "described in section 103." Nevertheless, § 7478 demonstrates that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of that section,
prospective issuers had no means to determine whether the interest on
their bonds would be tax exempt. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-1263, pp. 150-151
(1978).
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and the Service, present law does not allow the State or
local government to go to court. The controversy can
be resolved only if the bonds are issued, a bondholder excludes interest on the bonds from income, the exclusion
is disallowed, and the Service asserts a deficiency in its
statutory notice of deficiency. This uncertainty coupled
with the threat of the ultimate loss of the exclusion, invariably makes it impossible to market the bonds. In
addition, it is impossible for a State or local government
to question the Service rulings and regulations directly.
"[S]tate and local government[s] should have a right to
court adjudiciation in the situation described above.
The bill deals with the problem by providing ... for a
declaratory judgment as to the tax status of a proposed
issue of municipal bonds." S. Rep. No. 95-1263, pp.
150-151 (1978).
The Conference Report reflects a similar view of prevailing
law. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1800, p. 240 (1978).
Thus, in 1974, 1976, and again in 1978, Congress expressed
its belief that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act generally bars
nontaxpayers from bringing the kind of injunctive action the
State of South Carolina asks lea.ve to file today. 9
These subsequently enacted provisions and the legislative
understanding of them are entitled to "great weight" in construing earlier, related legislation. See, e. g., Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969);
Federal Housing Admin. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S.
• Our cases make clear that the constitutional nature of a challenge to a
tax, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no consequence under
the Anti-Injunction Act. See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416
U. S. 752, 759 (1974); Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 20 (1922); Dodge v.
Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 121 (1916). Congress can be presumed to have had
knowledge of those cases when it amended the Act in 1966 and in later
years when it passed related legislation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc . v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 382, and n. 66 (1982);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978).
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84, 90 (1958). Combined with the legislative purposes obviously motivating the 39th and 89th Congresses, these provisions conclusively demonstrate that, absent express exemption, the Act generally precludes judicial resolution of all
abstract tax controversies, even if the complaining parties
would have no other forum in which to bring their challenges.

c
The Court drew these same conclusions in Bob Jones University v. Simon. See 416 U. S. 725, 736-746. In that case,
the Court rejected a private institution's request that an additional exception beyond the one created in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962) (equity
court may issue injunction where it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government prevail), be carved out of
the Act. 10 The Court responded that Williams Packing:
"was meant to be the capstone to judicial construction of
the Act. It spells an end to a cyclical pattern of allegiance to the plain meaning of the Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by the judicial departure from
that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's redisclosing of the Act's purpose." 416 U. S., at 742.

Bob Jones University then reaffirmed that, except where a
litigant can show both that the government would "under no
circumstances prevail" and that equity jurisdiction is otherwise present, the Act would be given its "literal effect." I d.,
at 736, 742-745.
Because the plaintiffs in Bob Jones University were assured ultimately of having access to a judicial forum, the
Court did not definitively resolve whether Congress could
0

The Williams Packing exception is not applicable in this case.
Though South Carolina's Tenth Amendment and intergovernmental tax
immunity claims are serious ones, we cannot say that there are no circumstances under which the Government could prevail. Thus, even if§ 310(b)
would cause the State irreparable injury, South Carolina could not rely on
the Williams Packing exception to invoke a court's authority to review.
'
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bar a tax suit in which the complaining party would be denied
all access to judicial review. See 416 U. S., at 746. But the
Court's reference to "a case in which an aggrieved party has
no access at all to judicial review" came in the context of its
discussion of the taxpayer's claim that postponement of its
challenge to the revocation of its tax-exempt status would violate due process. Bob Jones University's dictum, therefore, should be interpreted only as reflecting the established
rule that Congress cannot, consistently with due process,
deny a taxpayer with property rights at stake all opportunity
for an ultimate judicial determination of the legality of a tax
assessment against him. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
u. s. 589, 596-597 (1931).
On this reading, Bob Jones University's recognition that
the complete inaccessability of judicial review might implicate due process concerns provides absolutely no basis for
crafting an exception in this case. The State of South Carolina is not a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
323-324 (1966). Nor does the State assert a right cognizable
as a "property" interest protected by that Clause. See generally Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
430-433 (19
cata oguing cases). Therefore, it has no due
process right to review of its claim in a judicial forum. 11
Taxing measures inevitably have a pecuniary impact on nontaxpayers
who are linked to the persons against whom a tax is imposed. This Court
has held that the indirect impacts of a tax, no matter how detrimental, generally do not invade any interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause.
See, e. g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra (indirect impacts on charitable organization); United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam) (indirect impacts on First Amendment
interests of employees). There is no occasion here to address when, if
ever, such indirect impacts would implicate Due Process concerns if no judicial review of the complaining party's direct tax liabilities would ultimately be available. Cf. Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra, at
747-748 (discussing powerful governmental interests); Investment Annu~
ity, Inc . v. Blumenthal, 609 F. 2d 1, 7-10 (CADC 1979) (indirect impact'
11
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In holding that the Act does not bar suits by nontaxpayers
with no other remedies, the Court today has created a
"breach in the general scheme of taxation [that] gives an
opening for the disorganization of the whole plan[.]" Allen
v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 454 (Reed, J., concurring in the
result). Non-taxpaying associations of taxpayers, and most
other nontaxpayers, will now be allowed to sidestep Congress~ policy against judicial resolution of abstract tax controversies. They can now challenge both Congress~tax statutes and the Internal Revenue Service's regulations, revenue
rulings, and private letter decisions. In doing so, they can
impede the process of collecting federal revenues and require
Treasury to focus its energies on questions deemed important
not by it or Congress but by a host of private plaintiffs. The
Court's holding travels "a long way down the road to the
emasculation of the Anti-Injunction Act, and down the companion pathway that leads to the blunting of the strict requirements of Williams Packing .... " Commissioner v.
Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614, 635 (1976) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I simply cannot join such a fundamental undermining
of the congressional purpose.
II

The Act's language, purpose, and history should leave no \
doubt that Congress intended to preclude both taxpayer and
nontaxpayer suits, regardless of the availability of an alternative forum. The Solicitor General agrees and contends that,
since the anti-injunction proliib1tion extends to "an court;"lt
shou
e read to~ s ourt acting in its origiilafJUrisdlctionaswell. The Solicitor General's contention raises a
grave constitutional question: namely, whether Congress
constitutionally can impose remedial limitations so jurisdictional in nature that they effectively withdraw the original
jurisdiction of this Court.
on nontaxpaying business does not implicate Due Process Clause even
though no judicial review otherwise available).

~

"'.:s
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A

Under the language used in Article III of the Constitution,
Congress relates to the courts of the United States in three
textually different ways. 12 In it broadest textual delegation,
that Article authorizes Congress to establish the "inferior
Courts" and places no express limits on the congressional
power to regulate the courts so created. See U. S. Const.
Art. III, § 1, cl. 1. By constrast, that Article itse creates
the Supreme Court and textuallY differentiates between ongress's relationship with the appellate and or 'nal 'urisdictions o t a ourt.
icle I express y empowers Congress to make" "Exceptions" and "Regulations" to the
appellate jurisdiction. U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 2; Ex
Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869) (dismissing for want of
appellate jurisdiction). But, in what is effectively its narrowest delegation, Article III is silent regarding Congress's
authority to make exceptions to or regulations regarding
cases in the original jurisdiction-those that affect "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party." Ibid.
12
Article III rovides, in pertinent part, that:
"Secti;m:-y The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish ....
"Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; ... ;to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... .
"In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction.~ases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." U. S. Const., Art. III, §§ 1, 2.

~·
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Though the original history of Article III is sparse, 13 what
is available indicates that these textual differences were purposeful on the Framers' part. The Framers obviously
thought that the national government should have a judicial
system of its own and that that system should have a Supreme Court. However, because the Framers believed the
State courts would be adequate for resolving most disputes,
they generally left Congress the power of determining what
cases, if any, should be channelled to the federal courts. The
one textual exception to that rule concerned the original jurisdiction, where the Framers apparently mandated that Supreme Court review be available. "The evident purpose was
to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the
determination, in the first instance, of suits involving a State
or a diplomatic or commercial representative of a foreign government." Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 464 (1883). The
Framers apparently thought that "[s]o much was due ... the
rank and dignity of those for whom the provision was
made .... " Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 81, pp.
507-509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). Perhaps more
importantly, the Framers also thought that the original jurisdiction was a necessary substitute for the powers of war and
diplomacy that these sovereigns previously had relied upon.
See Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U. S. 439, 450 (1945);
United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 641 (1892). "The Su- 1
preme Court [was] given higher standing than any known tribunal, both by the nature of its rights and the categories subject to its jurisdiction ... ," A.:...deToqueville, Democracy in
America, p. 149 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969) (emph asis in original),
precisely to keep sovereign nations and States from using
force "to rebuff the exaggerated pretensions of the
Union .... " Id., at 150.

I

3
' See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 665, and n. 3 (1959).
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Our cases have long paid tribute to the foreign sovereignty
and federalism concerns forming the basis of the original jurisdiction. See Ames v. Kansas, supra, at 464-465; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 743 (1981). Out of respect
for these concerns, the Court has held that Congress is without power to add parties not within the initial grant of original jurisdiction, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174
(1803), and has indicated, in dicta, that Congress may not
withdraw that jurisdiction either. See, e. g., California v.
Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 65-66 (1979); California v. Southern
Pacific Co., 157 U. S. 229, 261 (1895); Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 300 (1888); Ames v. Kansas,
111 U. S. 449, 464 (1884); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1
Wheat. 304, 332 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, supra, 1
Cranch, at 174. Enlarging the original jurisdiction would require the sovereigns for whom the provision was made to
compete with other, less dignified, parties for the Court's
limited time and resources; diminishing the original jurisdiction possibly would leave those sovereigns without an acceptable alternative to diplomacy and war for settling disputes.
To be sure, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act does not expressly
withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court. Rather, it
merely prohibits "any court" from "maintain[ing]" a suit that
has "the purpose of restraining the assessment and collection" of Federal taxes. See 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). The effect of this prohibition, however, is to preclude this Court
ever from assuming original jurisdiction to adjudicate a State
qua State's Tenth and Sixteenth Amendment tax claims, in
apparent derogation of the grant's constitutional purpose. 14
"The Solicitor General contends that the Act only fortuitously prevents
the State of South Carolina from invoking its constitutional claims in this
Court. See Supplemental Memorandum 6-7. I do not think the fortuity
of the effect saves the statute from constitutional doubt. As the Solicitor
General himself reads the Act, it categorically prevents the State of South
Carolina from maintaining a suit in this Court's original jurisdiction, which
is precisely what Article III arguably entitles the State to do. The fact
that a bond interest recipient can litigate the constitutionality of§ 310(b) in

..

No. 94, Orig.-CONCUR
SOUTH CAROLINA v. REGAN

15

While "Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of
the federal courts and over the sovereign immunity of the
United States[,] it is extremely doubtful that they include the
power to limit in this manner the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution." California v.
Arizona, supra, at 66.
B
Nevertheless, it is this Court's long-standing practice to
avoid resolution of constitutional questions except when absolutely necessary. Ibid. ''When the validity of an act of
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). Such a construction is possible in this case.
The manifest purpose of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act is
simply to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes
without undue judicial interference and to require that legal
challenges be raised in certain designated forums. The language and history of the Act evidence a congressional desire
generally to bar both taxpayer and nontaxpayer suits, since
both can substantially interrupt "the process of collecting
taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence" if left uncontrolled. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92
U. S. 575, 613 (1875). Similarly, the language and history
evidence a congressional desire to prohibit courts from restraining any aspect of the tax laws' administration, since the
prohibition against injunctions should not depend upon the alleged legality or character of a particular assessment. See
Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 192-194 (1883). Yet the
statute was enacted against a settled history in which foreign
and State sovereigns had a unique right to seek refuge in the
original jurisdiction of this Court. Nothing in the legislative
due course, see id., at 7, does not mitigate an otherwise effective denial of
the original forum to the State of South Carolina.
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history of the Act of 1867, of the later amendments, or of the
related declaratory judgment provisions enacted in 1974,
1976, or 1978, mentions any intent to alter these sovereign
parties' unique right occasionally to seek injunctive relief by
original action in this Court, even with regard to tax matters.
¢.Admittedly, the Act precludes "any court" from maintaining
a suit initiated for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of Federal taxes. See 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a).
That language clearly instructs all courts that Congress constitutionally controls not to prematurely interfere with the
assessment and collection of Federal taxes. That language
does not however, necessaril enco ass this Court, which
Congress did not create and which Congress is not expressly
empowered to make "Exceptions" or "Regulations" as to its
original jurisdiction. Moreover, since only a small number of
pre-enforcement suits could conceivably involve a party for
whom the original jurisdiction was created, there is no reason
to believe that Congress would want to have the constitutionality of its anti-injunction policy placed into question. 15
Given this de minimis effect and the absence of express congressional intent to the contrary, I would conclude that the
Act's reference to "any court" means to assure that all state,
as well as federal, courts are subject to the anti-injunction
prohibition. Such an interpretation gives meaning to the
Act and avoids a grave constitutional question. 16
'"In this vein, Congress itself has recently questioned its power to withdraw the Court's original jurisdiction. In enacting the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, which changed the Court's original jurisdiction of actions
involving ambassadors or foreign states from exclusive to concurrent, the
Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that, "Congress may not deny to
the Supreme Court jurisdiction which is expressly granted by the Constitution." S. Rep. No. 95-1108, 2d. Sess ...,6 (1978).
16
Since the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201,
which prohibits "any court of the United States" from declaring rights of
parties "with respect to Federal taxes," clearly has no jurisdictional effect,
I have no occasion to address it at this time.

1

l
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III
Interpreting the Tax Anti-Injunction Act to bar both taxpayer and nontaxpayer claims in "any court" but this Court
requires a determination whether this case is "appropriate"
for the Court's obligatory original jurisdiction. Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 93 (1972). "[A]lthough it may initially have been contemplated that this Court would always
exercise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to
do so," Ohio v. Wyandotte, 401 U. S. 493, 497 (1971), our
cases recognize "the need [for] exercise of sound discretion in
order to protect this Court from an abuse of the opportunity
to resort to its original jurisdiction .... " Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19 (1939). An original party establishes that a case is "appropriate" for obligatory jurisdiction
by demonstrating, through "clear and convincing evidence,"
that it has suffered an injury of"serious magnitude," see New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309 (1921); see also Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 292 (1934), and that it otherwise will be without an alternative forum. Maryland v.
Louisiana, supra, at 740; Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, at
93. The State of South Carolina's motion for leave to e satisfies, albeit y t e barest of margins, both of these tests. 17
-ni"e State has demonstrated injury of "serious magnitude."
It contends, and provides uncontroverted aff#avits to support, that application of § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA will "materially interfere with and infringe upon the authority of South
Carolina to borrow funds." Motion for Leave to File Complaint 7. The authority the State claims has significant historical basis, see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (1895), and the injury the State alleges
could deprive it of a meaningful political choice. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 393, and n. 8 (1943).
The Solicitor General concedes that, absent a bar from the Anti-Injunction Act, this case falls within the literal terms of the constitutional and
statutory grant of original jurisdiction to this Court. See Supplemental
Memorandum 1-2.
17

41
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Twenty-three states have filed a joint brief amicus curiae in
support of South Carolina's motion, which further attests to
the "serious magnitude" of the federalism concerns at issue.
Similarly, the State qua State has demonstrated that it has
no adequate alternative forum in which to raise its unique
Tenth and Sixteenth Amendment claims. See Maryland v.
Lousiana, supra, at 743, and n. 19. If the State issues
bearer bonds and urges its purchasers to contest the legality
of§ 310(b)(1), it will suffer irremedial injury. The purchasers will inevitably demand higher interest rates as compensation for bearing the risk of future potential Federal taxes.
Conversely, if the State foresakes bearer bonds in favor of
registered ones, it will bear the increased expense that issuers of registered bonds incur, and it will be unable ever to
contest the constitutionality of§ 310(b)(1). In short, the State
will suffer irremedial injury if the Court does not assume
original jurisdiction.
Therefore, although great deference is due the long-standing congressional policy against premature judicial interference with Federal taxes, I believe it is proper to exercise the
Court's original jurisdiction under these highly unique circumstances. I emphasize both the unique circumstances of
this case and the congressional policy against premature judicial interference because original litigants should not be misled into believing that this Court will become a haven for
suits that cannot be entertained in lower courts with concurrent jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction is not a forum for
litigating everyday tax concerns. Rather, it must be "sparingly" invoked. United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538
(1973). Moreover, the legislative policy against premature
judicial interference embodied in the Act must be paid the
highest deference by this Court. Thus, where the original
party does not present a clear and convincing case that the
tax at issue will impair its ability to structure integral operations of its government and that irremedial injury is likely to
occur absent review in the original jurisdiction, I would defer
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to the legislative directive against premature judicial interference. 18 But since South Carolina's claims meet these
stringent requirements, its motion to file leave should be
granted.
IV
I agree with the Court that the record is not sufficiently
developed to permit us to address the merits and that a Special Master should be appointed. But I do not share its view
that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act applies only when Congress
has provided an alternative avenue for a complaining partyone with original status or not-to litigate claims on its own
behalf. That view is not, in my opinion, based on any fair or
even tenable canon of statutory construction, and cannot be
reconciled with express statements of congressional intent
and purpose. Accordingly, I can concur only in the Court's
judgment.

18
Thus, where Congress expressly leaves open an alternative forum in
which an original plaintiff can raise its claims, this Court will ordinarily
presume that original jurisdiction is inappropriate. For example, where
Congress allows the state, but not the federal, courts to issue injunctive
relief, as Congress has done in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §52,
and § 2283 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 2283, an original plaintiff
could rarely, if ever, demand access to the obligatory original jurisdiction.
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January 10, 1984

BRENNAN , .JR.

No. 94 Original
South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Sandra,
Thank you very much for your response of January 9. You
note that Part III of your draft concurrence concludes that the
exercise of our original jurisdiction is appropriate in this case
because South Carolina cannot bring a suit in a state court or a
lower federal court. I gather that it is this view that you
believe requires that we address the question discussed in your
Part I whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to a party that is
aggrieved by the actions of the IRS and has no alternative for urn
in which to raise his legal challenge. I still suggest that we
need not do so.
I think that it is enough to address the question, as you
do, whether South Carolina can sue in a lower federal court or a
state court. However, under your approach, that question does
not depend on whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies to a party
without an alternative remedy. You conclude that South Carolina
has an alternative forum in which to litigate its claims. That
forum is, of course, this Court. Therefore, under your view is
it not true that the difficult question whether the AntiInjunction Act bars a suit by a party who has no alternative
forum is simply not presented? For, once you conclude that South
Carolina may sue in this Court, the question whether they may sue
in a state court or a lower federal court is governed by the rule
of Williams Packing: the Anti-Injunction Act bars the suit of a
party who has an alternative forum in which to litigate his
claims absent a showing of irreparable harm and certainty of
success on the merits. Thus, regardless of whether the Act bars
a suit by a party that has no alternative remedy, South Carolina,
because it has an alternative remedy in this Court may not bring
this suit in a state court or a lower federal court.

-L.-

Perhaps we've reached the point where it would be helpful to
our discussion to know the views of our colleagues. I'll await
their responses with interest.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE
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J . BRENNAN, JR.

January 9, 1984

No.

f4 Original

South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Sandra:
I have read your draft concurrence in this
case with great interest. As I suggested in my
letter of December 20th, since you conclude that
the Anti-! nj unction Act does not apply to this
Court, it is not necessary to reach the question
wh~ther the Act would apply in the lower federal
courts in the absence of an alternative remedy.
Had South Carolina brought this action in a lower
federal court, any argument that the Act was
inapplicable because it had no alternative remedy
would be met with the simple response that a
remedy exists in this Court. Thus, upon
reflection, I am convinced that under your
approach, the question whether the Act would apply
in the absence of an alternative remedy is not
properly before this Court. Thus, even were I to
agree with your Part II (and I do find it
persuasive}, I couldn't agree that the analysis in
Part I is necessary to the decis.ion.

•

•

Sincerely,
/'

~·

,.

,9aJ
Justice 0' Connor
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 9, 1984

No. 94 Original

South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Bill,
Thank you for your letter concerning my draft
concurrence in this case.
Part II, with which you say you
might agree, concludes that, despite the all inclusive
language of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, the purpose and
history of the Act do not indicate that Congress meantto
withdraw this Court's original jurisdiction. To reach that
conclusion it seems to me it is necessary to discuss the
language, purpose, and history of the statute, giving
meaning to it all. Moreover, Part III concludes that
exercise of ou
ri inal jurisdiction is a ropriate because
Sou
arolina a non
r
has no alternat1ve reme
in
e1t er a state or federal court.
In s ort, it seems to me
that Parts II and III necessarily depend upon the analysis
and conclusion of Part I.
Sincerely,

•
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBER S O F

..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 12, 1984

No. 94 Orig., South Carolina v. Regan
Dear John:
I read your opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part in this case with interest. The question whether
South Carolina has a legitimate claim on the merits is one
we should have in mind as we consider whether to exercise
our original jurisdiction. I am still unsettled, however,
on what I see as the crucial issue in the case.
After the Pollock decision, advocates of the income tax
had to turn to an amendment to the Constitution as a means
of reviving the tax. In 1909, President Taft, along with
insurgent Republicans and the Democrats, proposed the joint
resolution that, in 1913, became the Sixteenth Amendment.
The most influential opposition to the proposed amendment,
when it was before the states for ratification, stemmed from
Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New York. Governor Hughes
stated that he believed the Federal government should have
the power to impose an unapportioned income tax. However,
he recommended against ratification because the words "from
whatever source derived" in the proposed amendment, "if
taken in their natural sense," would permit income from
state and municipal bonds to be taxed by the Federal
government, a power that would "affqrd the opportunity for
federal action in violation of the fundamental conditions of
State authority." Governor Hughes' construction was quoted
widely throughout the nation. Supporters of the Federal
income tax then attempted to assure the States that the
language of the Sixteenth Amendment was not intended to
apply to the income from state and municipal obligations.
See 45 Cong. Rec. 1696, 2245, 2247 (1910). Thus, there is a
substantial argument that the Framers of the Sixteenth
Amendment intended to codify the holding of Pollock: that
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interest from state, county, and municipal bonds could not
be taxed by the Federal government.
This Court, at various times since, has indicated that
the Sixteenth Amendment did not increase the Federal
government's power to tax such obligations. For example, in
1916, when Governor Hughes himself was on the Court, it was
held that the Sixteenth Amendment merely eliminated the
apportionment requirement. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11 (1916}. Two years later, the Court
reviewed the history of the Hughes' message and the
responses, reaching the same result. See Peck & Co. v.
Lowe, 247 u.s. 165, 172 (1918}. Then, in 1932, Chief
Justice Hughes, in upholding the constitutionality of a tax
on the capital gains from trading in state and municipal
securities, expressly distinguished that tax from one on
"the obligations themselves," Willicut v. Bunns, 282 U.S.
216, 226 (1931}, and concluded that the only subject "held
to be exempt from Federal taxation is the principal and
interest of the obligations." Ibid.
In addition to this original history and subsequent
judicial interpretation, there are various indications in
Congress that a constitutional amendment would be necessary
to secure taxation on the interest earned on state and
municipal securities. See 76 Cong. Rec. 3588 (1933}; 65
Cong. Rec. 347 (1924}; id., at 43.
None of this is conclusive, of course. But I believe
the original intent of the Framers of the Sixteenth
Amendment is a constitutional issue worthy of litigation in
this Court's original jurisdiction. Therefore, without
expressing any view on the ultimate disposition of the
merits, I still think the Court should exercise its
discretion to grant leave to file the complaint.
Sincerely,

s~
Sandra D•• O'Connor

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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January 13, 1984

94 Ori.g. South Carolina v.

Req~n

Dear Hill:
1 have followed with inter.est th~ exch~nge of
views by vou a.nd Sannra, and note vour lett.er of January 10
in which vou invjte th~ viBws of ot~er Ju~tices.

Tn my note of DPcernber 1.9, T advised that r would
await Sandra's concurring oni.nion. ! t se~ms to me that her
views of. the tax Anti-Tnjunct:.ion Act ar.e fully jn accor.d
t1ith my opinion for the Court in Bob ,Jones.

('

Also, i t seems advisable to ~ecide whether South
Carolina could sue in any other court. I.f there \..rere an
alt<:!rnat iv€' r(.)medy, T assume we \-IOt.tl.d have decU.ned jur i.sdiction. The reason South Carolina cannot hrina suit in a
lower court is becau!=;e the Anti-Iniunction A.ct, as I vi.f'W
it , io an absolute bar.
For thesP reasons, J am inclined to joi~ Sandra
but - in view of your Jetter -will await other views that
~ay be expressed.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 16, 1984
Re:

No. 94 Orig.

South Carolina v. Regan

Dear Sandra:
I am in substantial accord with your concurring
opinion; please join me in it.
Sincerely,

WlM/
Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

!'n;rrtmt Qiottrt Df tlft ~tb !'tattg
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 24, 1984

Re: 94 Original - South Carolina v. Regan
Dear Bill,
After again exam1n1ng the various writings in this case, I
would grant leave to file and much prefer your reasons for
arriving at that result.
Sandra takes you to task for
disregarding the plain language of the statute of §7421, but she
ends up doing the same thing in the name of avoiding a
constitutional question, which, by the way, she all but decides.
Also, as I read her circulating draft at p. 10, barring a
taxpayer all judicial review would raise constitutional issues.
Thus, if a taxpayer were involved in this case and had no way to
turn, §7421 would have to give way, despite its plain language,
just as it does for Sandra to reach her end result.
In
comparison, construing the section to accommodate a State without
a remedy for an alleged serious injury to its pocketbook and its
ability to borrow is not objectionable to me.
Furthermore, your
approach would permit us to refer a state to the District Court,
which could not be done under Sandra's approach. Although there
is much in what John says, I agree with you that we should keep
the case here and grant leave to file.
In short, please join me.
Sincerely yours,

AY'Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
cpm

31,

94 Or:lg.

South Carolina v .

R~qan

Dear Sandra:
~

PJ P.etse join me in your concurri.ng opinion.

Slncerely,

ll.

Justrice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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February 1, 1'984

CHAMISERS Of'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

94 Original - South Carolina v. Regan,
Secretary of Treasury

Dear Bill:
I join.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

&94 Orig. South Carolina v. Regan (Cammie)
WJB for the Court 10/7/83
1st draft 12/13/83
2nd draft - 2/17/84
3rd draft 2/20/84
Joined by TM 12/13/83
Joined by BRW 1/24/84
Joined by CA 2/1/84
SOC concuring in judgment 1/7/874
1st draft 1/7/84
2nd draft 2/6/84
Joined by LFP 1/31/84
JPS joins Parts I and II, will write 12/14/83
1st draft concurring in part and dissenting in part
2nd draft 1/17/84
WHR joins SOC's concurring opinion . l/16/84
1/11/84
LFP awaiting SOC's concurrence 12/19/83
LFP awaiting WJB response to SOC
HAB concurring in the judgment
1st draft 1/31/84

